| Summary: | <p>This dissertation studies the concept of reflexivity in ‘Frankfurt School’ Critical Theory. To act reflexively is to attempt to gain a clearer perspective on the partiality and fallibility of one’s beliefs in order to become aware of the influence they have on the object of study. This is important for Critical Theories, since they are committed to the view that their research shouldn’t just be an academic curiosity that reflects passively upon the world, but ought to contribute to forms of collective change that alleviate unjust social relations. Hence, Critical Theories are characterised by an emancipatory ambition.</p>
<p>I make two interventions regarding the role of reflexivity in Critical Theory. First, I propose a paradigm of Critical Theories that is rooted in the notion of ‘reflexive responsibility’. Given the vital role of reflexivity in regulating the conduct of critical social theorists, exploring the relationship between the emancipatory and reflexive dimensions of Critical Theories offers us a perspective immanent to critical social theories from which to evaluate their success. When methodologies are found to ignore or underplay certain features of the social world or fail to acknowledge how social experiences and perceptions are not interchangeable between different people, then such analyses undermine the emancipatory ambitions of critique and must be considered less responsible than if they didn’t take these risks.</p>
<p>The second proposal is that reflexive practice is most responsible when we understand it as having an implicit commitment to promoting the epistemic virtue of humility. To act with epistemic humility is to engage in a reflective action whereby we scrutinise the foundations of our knowledge and acknowledges the limitations of our knowledge. Without epistemic humility, projects which seek to mitigate social injustices can end up reinforcing their ideological structures since the theorist is less likely to reflect on things such as the suitability of their methods, the generalisability of their claims to different communities, or how their work connects to the social struggles that their work claims to be in the service of.</p>
<p>Combined, these two proposals of reflexive responsibility and reflexive humility provide a framework to evaluate existing approaches to reflexivity in critical social theories. But, equally as important, they offer a new direction to envisage methods of critique that centre their emancipatory ambitions and offer insight into acting upon them responsibly. Therefore, this dissertation aims to highlight how recent work in critical social theory has proceeded irresponsibly with the view that highlighting this can help us identify more responsible ways of conducting social critique.</p>
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