Design of an application process for research grants
<p>We use a version of a Bayesian Stackelberg game to model a one-stage application process for research grants. A research council wants to allocate research grants to researchers in an environment of imperfect information. The information asymmetry stems from the fact that selection should i...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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2011
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| Summary: | <p>We use a version of a Bayesian Stackelberg game to model a one-stage application process for research grants. A research council wants to allocate research grants to researchers in an environment of imperfect information. The information asymmetry stems from the fact that selection should ideally be based on the quality of the researcher's project. However, neither the researcher nor the research council know the quality but each agent receives a separate signal that is informative about it. We show that the application process always yields a better expected quality of research projects and that, despite the costs it imposes on each agent, the equilibrium of the game can be a welfare improvement over a random allocation of the research grants.</p> |
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