Psychopaths and blame : the argument from content
The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown bla...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Routledge
2014
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| _version_ | 1797102259889242112 |
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| author | Levy, N |
| author_facet | Levy, N |
| author_sort | Levy, N |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:03:25Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:ed01ce37-74c5-4605-b796-ce4109d568a0 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:03:25Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Routledge |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:ed01ce37-74c5-4605-b796-ce4109d568a02022-03-27T11:21:42ZPsychopaths and blame : the argument from contentJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:ed01ce37-74c5-4605-b796-ce4109d568a0Ethics (Moral philosophy)Ethics of the biosciencesPhilosophyPractical ethicsEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetRoutledge2014Levy, NThe recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm. |
| spellingShingle | Ethics (Moral philosophy) Ethics of the biosciences Philosophy Practical ethics Levy, N Psychopaths and blame : the argument from content |
| title | Psychopaths and blame : the argument from content |
| title_full | Psychopaths and blame : the argument from content |
| title_fullStr | Psychopaths and blame : the argument from content |
| title_full_unstemmed | Psychopaths and blame : the argument from content |
| title_short | Psychopaths and blame : the argument from content |
| title_sort | psychopaths and blame the argument from content |
| topic | Ethics (Moral philosophy) Ethics of the biosciences Philosophy Practical ethics |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT levyn psychopathsandblametheargumentfromcontent |