Aristotle on unity in metaphysics Z.12 and H.6
Aristotle’s inquiry into the definitional question ‘what is substance?’ in the central books of the Metaphysics is constrained by the unity requirement. Roughly, a particular hylomorphic compound substance, such as this human, ought to be a unified whole and not just a heap of material parts and for...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2023
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| Summary: | Aristotle’s inquiry into the definitional question ‘what is
substance?’ in the central books of the Metaphysics is constrained by
the unity requirement. Roughly, a particular hylomorphic compound
substance, such as this human, ought to be a unified whole and not just
a heap of material parts and form. A similar claim applies to the
substance-kind, human, which Metaphysics ΖΗΘ characterises as a
hylomorphic compound taken universally. I raise the following
question about this picture of unity: Is a compound’s unity basic or is it
derived from the form’s unity? Reading closely Metaphysics Z.12 and
H.6, I argue that the form is explanatorily basic for the compound's
unity. |
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