Pragmatic causation
<p>Russell famously argued that causation should be dispensed with. He gave two explicit arguments for this conclusion, both of which can be defused if we loosen the ties between causation and determinism. I show that we can define a concept of causation which meets Russell's conditions b...
Autor Principal: | Eagle, A |
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Formato: | Book section |
Idioma: | English |
Publicado: |
Oxford University Press
2007
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Subjects: |
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