Belief revision normalized
<p>We use the normality framework of Goodman and Salow (2018, 2021, 2023b) to investigate of dynamics of rational belief. The guiding idea is that people are entitled to believe that their circumstances aren’t especially abnormal. More precisely, a rational agent&am...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer
2024
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| _version_ | 1817931744382287872 |
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| author | Goodman, J Salow, B |
| author_facet | Goodman, J Salow, B |
| author_sort | Goodman, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>We use the normality framework of Goodman and Salow (2018, 2021, 2023b) to investigate of dynamics of rational belief. The guiding idea is that people are entitled to believe that their circumstances aren’t especially abnormal. More precisely, a rational agent’s beliefs rule out all and only those possibilities that are either (i) ruled out by their <em>evidence</em> or (ii) <em>sufficiently less normal</em> than some other possibility not ruled out by their evidence. Working within this framework, we argue that the logic of rational belief revision is much weaker than is usually supposed. We do so by isolating a natural family of orthodox principles about belief revision, describing realistic cases in which these principles seem to fail, and showing how these counterexamples are predicted by independently motivated models of the cases in question. In these models, whether one evidential possibility counts as sufficiently less normal than another is determined by underlying probabilities (together with a contextually determined question). We argue that the resulting probabilistic account of belief compares favorably with other such accounts, including Lockeanism (Foley, 1993), a ‘stability’ account inspired by Leitgeb (2017), the ‘tracking theory’ of Lin and Kelly (2012), and the influential precursor of Levi (1967). We show that all of these accounts yield subtly different but similarly heterodox logics of belief revision.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-23T23:27:12Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:f009bf49-cfcf-4333-9442-7b201ac92b89 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-09T03:26:53Z |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:f009bf49-cfcf-4333-9442-7b201ac92b892024-11-28T09:07:46ZBelief revision normalizedJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:f009bf49-cfcf-4333-9442-7b201ac92b89EnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2024Goodman, JSalow, B<p>We use the normality framework of Goodman and Salow (2018, 2021, 2023b) to investigate of dynamics of rational belief. The guiding idea is that people are entitled to believe that their circumstances aren’t especially abnormal. More precisely, a rational agent’s beliefs rule out all and only those possibilities that are either (i) ruled out by their <em>evidence</em> or (ii) <em>sufficiently less normal</em> than some other possibility not ruled out by their evidence. Working within this framework, we argue that the logic of rational belief revision is much weaker than is usually supposed. We do so by isolating a natural family of orthodox principles about belief revision, describing realistic cases in which these principles seem to fail, and showing how these counterexamples are predicted by independently motivated models of the cases in question. In these models, whether one evidential possibility counts as sufficiently less normal than another is determined by underlying probabilities (together with a contextually determined question). We argue that the resulting probabilistic account of belief compares favorably with other such accounts, including Lockeanism (Foley, 1993), a ‘stability’ account inspired by Leitgeb (2017), the ‘tracking theory’ of Lin and Kelly (2012), and the influential precursor of Levi (1967). We show that all of these accounts yield subtly different but similarly heterodox logics of belief revision.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Goodman, J Salow, B Belief revision normalized |
| title | Belief revision normalized |
| title_full | Belief revision normalized |
| title_fullStr | Belief revision normalized |
| title_full_unstemmed | Belief revision normalized |
| title_short | Belief revision normalized |
| title_sort | belief revision normalized |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT goodmanj beliefrevisionnormalized AT salowb beliefrevisionnormalized |