Quality space computations for consciousness
The quality space hypothesis about conscious experience proposes that conscious sensory states are experienced in relation to other possible sensory states. For instance, the colour red is experienced as being more like orange, and less like green or blue. Recent empirical findings suggest that subj...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Cell Press
2024
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| _version_ | 1824458947757604864 |
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| author | Fleming, SM Shea, N |
| author_facet | Fleming, SM Shea, N |
| author_sort | Fleming, SM |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The quality space hypothesis about conscious experience proposes that conscious sensory states are experienced in relation to other possible sensory states. For instance, the colour red is experienced as being more like orange, and less like green or blue. Recent empirical findings suggest that subjective similarity space can be explained in terms of similarities in neural activation patterns. Here, we consider how localist, workspace, and higher-order theories of consciousness can accommodate claims about the qualitative character of experience and functionally support a quality space. We review existing empirical evidence for each of these positions, and highlight novel experimental tools, such as altering local activation spaces via brain stimulation or behavioural training, that can distinguish these accounts. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-25T04:19:40Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:f0595ad5-eb2a-4fe0-8677-e05a6523a8e6 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-02-19T04:33:59Z |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| publisher | Cell Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:f0595ad5-eb2a-4fe0-8677-e05a6523a8e62025-01-22T09:49:07ZQuality space computations for consciousnessJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:f0595ad5-eb2a-4fe0-8677-e05a6523a8e6EnglishSymplectic ElementsCell Press2024Fleming, SMShea, NThe quality space hypothesis about conscious experience proposes that conscious sensory states are experienced in relation to other possible sensory states. For instance, the colour red is experienced as being more like orange, and less like green or blue. Recent empirical findings suggest that subjective similarity space can be explained in terms of similarities in neural activation patterns. Here, we consider how localist, workspace, and higher-order theories of consciousness can accommodate claims about the qualitative character of experience and functionally support a quality space. We review existing empirical evidence for each of these positions, and highlight novel experimental tools, such as altering local activation spaces via brain stimulation or behavioural training, that can distinguish these accounts. |
| spellingShingle | Fleming, SM Shea, N Quality space computations for consciousness |
| title | Quality space computations for consciousness |
| title_full | Quality space computations for consciousness |
| title_fullStr | Quality space computations for consciousness |
| title_full_unstemmed | Quality space computations for consciousness |
| title_short | Quality space computations for consciousness |
| title_sort | quality space computations for consciousness |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT flemingsm qualityspacecomputationsforconsciousness AT shean qualityspacecomputationsforconsciousness |