Adverse selection and the performance of private equity co-investments

Investors increasingly look for private equity managers to provide opportunities for co-investing outside the fund structure, thereby saving fees and carried interest payments. In this paper, we use a large sample of buyout and venture capital co-investments to test how such deals compare with the r...

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Main Authors: Braun, R, Jenkinson, T, Schemmerl, C
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2019
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author Braun, R
Jenkinson, T
Schemmerl, C
author_facet Braun, R
Jenkinson, T
Schemmerl, C
author_sort Braun, R
collection OXFORD
description Investors increasingly look for private equity managers to provide opportunities for co-investing outside the fund structure, thereby saving fees and carried interest payments. In this paper, we use a large sample of buyout and venture capital co-investments to test how such deals compare with the remaining fund investments. In contrast to Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015), we find no evidence of adverse selection. Gross return distributions of co-investments and other deals are similar. Co-investments generally have lower costs to investors. We simulate net returns to investors and demonstrate how reasonably sized portfolios of co-investments significantly outperform fund returns.
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spelling oxford-uuid:f0b81a82-4ec1-44fc-abce-d5a64bfac0822024-02-26T10:55:31ZAdverse selection and the performance of private equity co-investmentsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:f0b81a82-4ec1-44fc-abce-d5a64bfac082EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordElsevier2019Braun, RJenkinson, TSchemmerl, CInvestors increasingly look for private equity managers to provide opportunities for co-investing outside the fund structure, thereby saving fees and carried interest payments. In this paper, we use a large sample of buyout and venture capital co-investments to test how such deals compare with the remaining fund investments. In contrast to Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015), we find no evidence of adverse selection. Gross return distributions of co-investments and other deals are similar. Co-investments generally have lower costs to investors. We simulate net returns to investors and demonstrate how reasonably sized portfolios of co-investments significantly outperform fund returns.
spellingShingle Braun, R
Jenkinson, T
Schemmerl, C
Adverse selection and the performance of private equity co-investments
title Adverse selection and the performance of private equity co-investments
title_full Adverse selection and the performance of private equity co-investments
title_fullStr Adverse selection and the performance of private equity co-investments
title_full_unstemmed Adverse selection and the performance of private equity co-investments
title_short Adverse selection and the performance of private equity co-investments
title_sort adverse selection and the performance of private equity co investments
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AT schemmerlc adverseselectionandtheperformanceofprivateequitycoinvestments