The Evolution of Collective Action.
A public good is produced if and only if a team of m or more volunteers contribute to it. An equilibrium-selection problem leads to the questions: will the collective action succeed? If so, who will participate in the team? The paper studies the evolution of collective action: as part of a strategy-...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2005
|
| _version_ | 1797103312884989952 |
|---|---|
| author | Myatt, D Wallace, C |
| author_facet | Myatt, D Wallace, C |
| author_sort | Myatt, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | A public good is produced if and only if a team of m or more volunteers contribute to it. An equilibrium-selection problem leads to the questions: will the collective action succeed? If so, who will participate in the team? The paper studies the evolution of collective action: as part of a strategy-revision process, updating players choose quantal responses to existing play. With symmetric players, success depends upon the cost of contribution, the benefit from provision, and the critical team-size m; the relative variability of costs and benefits, and their correlation, are also critical. When players differ, successful teams consist of either the most efficient contributors, or those with the most idiosyncratic preferences. The addition of a single “bad apple” (for instance, an individual whose costs are particularly variable) to a population in which a successful team operates may result in destabilisation: over time, the bad apple might supplant an existing contributor, prompting a collapse. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:18:20Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:f1da44b4-5492-4a1c-9d5a-1b54f5ebaf8e |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:18:20Z |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publisher | Department of Economics (University of Oxford) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:f1da44b4-5492-4a1c-9d5a-1b54f5ebaf8e2022-03-27T11:59:11ZThe Evolution of Collective Action.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:f1da44b4-5492-4a1c-9d5a-1b54f5ebaf8eEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2005Myatt, DWallace, CA public good is produced if and only if a team of m or more volunteers contribute to it. An equilibrium-selection problem leads to the questions: will the collective action succeed? If so, who will participate in the team? The paper studies the evolution of collective action: as part of a strategy-revision process, updating players choose quantal responses to existing play. With symmetric players, success depends upon the cost of contribution, the benefit from provision, and the critical team-size m; the relative variability of costs and benefits, and their correlation, are also critical. When players differ, successful teams consist of either the most efficient contributors, or those with the most idiosyncratic preferences. The addition of a single “bad apple” (for instance, an individual whose costs are particularly variable) to a population in which a successful team operates may result in destabilisation: over time, the bad apple might supplant an existing contributor, prompting a collapse. |
| spellingShingle | Myatt, D Wallace, C The Evolution of Collective Action. |
| title | The Evolution of Collective Action. |
| title_full | The Evolution of Collective Action. |
| title_fullStr | The Evolution of Collective Action. |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Evolution of Collective Action. |
| title_short | The Evolution of Collective Action. |
| title_sort | evolution of collective action |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT myattd theevolutionofcollectiveaction AT wallacec theevolutionofcollectiveaction AT myattd evolutionofcollectiveaction AT wallacec evolutionofcollectiveaction |