The Evolution of Collective Action.
A public good is produced if and only if a team of m or more volunteers contribute to it. An equilibrium-selection problem leads to the questions: will the collective action succeed? If so, who will participate in the team? The paper studies the evolution of collective action: as part of a strategy-...
Hlavní autoři: | Myatt, D, Wallace, C |
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Médium: | Working paper |
Jazyk: | English |
Vydáno: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2005
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