Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated Bidders

Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated Bidders

Veure altres versions (1)

Dades bibliogràfiques
Autors principals:	Caragiannis, I, Kaklamanis, C, Kyropoulou, M
Format:	Llibre
Publicat:	2013

Ítems similars

Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders
per: Kyropoulou, M, et al.
Publicat: (2016)

Revenue Guarantees in Sponsored Search Auctions
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2012)

Revenue Guarantees in the Generalized Second Price Auction
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2014)

On the Efficiency of Equilibria in Generalized Second Price Auctions
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2011)

Auction Design with Advised Bidders
per: Tsoy, Anton, et al.
Publicat: (2019)

Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2014)

Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions
per: Gorbenko, Alexander S., et al.
Publicat: (2015)

Forward-looking bidders in sequential auctions
per: Zeithammer, Robert, 1975-
Publicat: (2006)

Signalling in auctions for risk-averse bidders.
per: Olivier Bos, et al.
Publicat: (2022-01-01)

Signalling in auctions for risk-averse bidders
per: Olivier Bos, et al.
Publicat: (2022-01-01)

Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2014)

Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement
per: Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980-
Publicat: (2005)

Discriminating Bidders Can Improve Efficiency in Auction
per: Yang, Yong Hyeon
Publicat: (2014-11-01)

Near−optimal multi−unit auctions with ordered bidders
per: Bhattacharya, S, et al.
Publicat: (2013)

Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
per: Bhattacharya, S, et al.
Publicat: (2020)

An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders
per: Gerard van der Laan, et al.
Publicat: (2016-12-01)

Tight approximation bounds for combinatorial frugal coverage algorithms
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2013)

Tight approximation bounds for combinatorial frugal coverage algorithms
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2012)

Tight Approximation Bounds for Greedy Frugal Coverage Algorithms
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2011)

Boosted Second Price Auctions: Revenue Optimization for Heterogeneous Bidders
per: Golrezaei, Negin, et al.
Publicat: (2022)

An Investigation of Value Updating Bidders in Simultaneous Online Art Auctions
per: Mayukh Dass, et al.
Publicat: (2010-01-01)

Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
per: Yeon-Koo Che, et al.
Publicat: (2006-03-01)

An Improved Approximation Bound for Spanning Star Forest and Color Saving
per: Athanassopoulos, S, et al.
Publicat: (2009)

Hazard Analysis of Bidder Collusion in Reverse Auctions Based on Petri Nets
per: Xiaodan Zhang, et al.
Publicat: (2020-01-01)

The Efficiency of Fair Division
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2012)

On Low−Envy Truthful Allocations
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2009)

The Efficiency of Fair Division
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2009)

The efficiency of fair division
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2011)

Analyzing the performance of multiple agents with varying bidding behaviors and standard bidders in online auctions
per: Sow, Jacob, et al.
Publicat: (2013)

Maximizing bidder’s profit in online auctions using grey system theory predictor agent
per: Deborah Lim, et al.
Publicat: (2012)

The Impact of Altruism on the Efficiency of Atomic Congestion Games
per: Caragiannis, I, et al.
Publicat: (2010)

Modeling dynamic procurement auctions of standardized supply contracts in electricity markets including bidders adaptation
per: Henry Camilo Torres-Valderrama, et al.
Publicat: (2015-01-01)

From English to First-Price Sealed Bid: An Empirical Assessment of the Change in Auction Type on Experienced Bidders
per: Miller Joshua J.
Publicat: (2014-06-01)

Bidder Strategies.
per: Klemperer, P
Publicat: (2004)

Bidders Recommender for Public Procurement Auctions Using Machine Learning: Data Analysis, Algorithm, and Case Study with Tenders from Spain
per: Manuel J. García Rodríguez, et al.
Publicat: (2020-01-01)

The Comparison of life satisfaction, coping styles and resilience in divorced bidder and non-bidder women
per: Faramarz Asanjarani, et al.
Publicat: (2017-03-01)

A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions
per: Mingming Gong, et al.
Publicat: (2021-01-01)

Bidder earnings forecasts in mergers and acquisitions
per: Amel-Zadeh, A, et al.
Publicat: (2019)

Effect of acquisition on wealth of bidder firm
per: Seah Hui Heang Cheryl, Teo Tian Siong Ricky, Yeo Tiong Beng
Publicat: (2014)

Reserve Price When Bidders are Asymmetric
per: Hikmet Gunay, et al.
Publicat: (2013-02-01)