Practical ethics given moral uncertainty
A number of philosophers have claimed that we should take not just empirical uncertainty but also fundamental moral uncertainty into account in our decision-making, and that, despite widespread moral disagreement, doing so would allow us to draw robust lessons for some issues in practical ethics. In...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Cambridge University Press
2019
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| _version_ | 1826304895368560640 |
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| author | Macaskill, W |
| author_facet | Macaskill, W |
| author_sort | Macaskill, W |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | A number of philosophers have claimed that we should take not just empirical uncertainty but also fundamental moral uncertainty into account in our decision-making, and that, despite widespread moral disagreement, doing so would allow us to draw robust lessons for some issues in practical ethics. In this article, I argue that, so far, the implications for practical ethics have been drawn too simplistically. First, the implications of moral uncertainty for normative ethics are far more wide-ranging than has been noted so far. Second, one can’t straightforwardly argue from moral uncertainty to particular conclusions in practical ethics, both because of ‘interaction’ effects between moral issues, and because of the variety of different possible intertheoretic comparisons that one can reasonably endorse. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:24:39Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:f3da6f54-8017-432a-a294-7d7707e6a74d |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:24:39Z |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:f3da6f54-8017-432a-a294-7d7707e6a74d2022-03-27T12:15:19ZPractical ethics given moral uncertaintyJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:f3da6f54-8017-432a-a294-7d7707e6a74dSymplectic Elements at OxfordCambridge University Press2019Macaskill, WA number of philosophers have claimed that we should take not just empirical uncertainty but also fundamental moral uncertainty into account in our decision-making, and that, despite widespread moral disagreement, doing so would allow us to draw robust lessons for some issues in practical ethics. In this article, I argue that, so far, the implications for practical ethics have been drawn too simplistically. First, the implications of moral uncertainty for normative ethics are far more wide-ranging than has been noted so far. Second, one can’t straightforwardly argue from moral uncertainty to particular conclusions in practical ethics, both because of ‘interaction’ effects between moral issues, and because of the variety of different possible intertheoretic comparisons that one can reasonably endorse. |
| spellingShingle | Macaskill, W Practical ethics given moral uncertainty |
| title | Practical ethics given moral uncertainty |
| title_full | Practical ethics given moral uncertainty |
| title_fullStr | Practical ethics given moral uncertainty |
| title_full_unstemmed | Practical ethics given moral uncertainty |
| title_short | Practical ethics given moral uncertainty |
| title_sort | practical ethics given moral uncertainty |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT macaskillw practicalethicsgivenmoraluncertainty |