Knowledge within the margin for error
Roy Sorensen's criticism of my use of margin for error principles to explain ignorance in borderline cases fails because it misidentifies the relevant margin for error principles. His alternative explanation in terms of truth-maker gaps is briefly criticized.
Main Author: | Williamson, T |
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Other Authors: | The Mind Association |
Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oxford University Press
2007
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Subjects: |
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