Strategic games and algorithmic secrecy
We challenge a claim commonly made by industry and government representatives and echoed by legal scholarship: that algorithmic decision-making processes are better kept opaque or secret because otherwise decision subjects will “game the system”, leading to inaccurate or unfair results. We show that...
| Príomhchruthaitheoirí: | , |
|---|---|
| Formáid: | Journal article |
| Teanga: | French English |
| Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
Erudit
2020
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| _version_ | 1826315397705498624 |
|---|---|
| author | Cofone, IN Strandburg, KJ |
| author_facet | Cofone, IN Strandburg, KJ |
| author_sort | Cofone, IN |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We challenge a claim commonly made by industry and government representatives and echoed by legal scholarship: that algorithmic decision-making processes are better kept opaque or secret because otherwise decision subjects will “game the system”, leading to inaccurate or unfair results. We show that the range of situations in which people are able to game decision-making algorithms is narrow, even when there is substantial disclosure. We then analyze how to identify when gaming is possible in light of (i) how tightly the decision-making proxies are tied to the factors that would ideally determine the outcome, (ii) how easily those proxies can be altered by decision subjects, and (iii) whether such strategic alterations ultimately lead to mistaken decisions. Based on this analysis, we argue that blanket claims that disclosure will lead to gaming are over-blown and that it will often be possible to construct socially beneficial disclosure regimes. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-25T04:36:33Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:f6284b29-9217-40a7-a5b8-4acd0da0e830 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | French English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-09T03:25:00Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Erudit |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:f6284b29-9217-40a7-a5b8-4acd0da0e8302024-11-27T12:40:55ZStrategic games and algorithmic secrecyJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:f6284b29-9217-40a7-a5b8-4acd0da0e830FrenchEnglishSymplectic ElementsErudit2020Cofone, INStrandburg, KJWe challenge a claim commonly made by industry and government representatives and echoed by legal scholarship: that algorithmic decision-making processes are better kept opaque or secret because otherwise decision subjects will “game the system”, leading to inaccurate or unfair results. We show that the range of situations in which people are able to game decision-making algorithms is narrow, even when there is substantial disclosure. We then analyze how to identify when gaming is possible in light of (i) how tightly the decision-making proxies are tied to the factors that would ideally determine the outcome, (ii) how easily those proxies can be altered by decision subjects, and (iii) whether such strategic alterations ultimately lead to mistaken decisions. Based on this analysis, we argue that blanket claims that disclosure will lead to gaming are over-blown and that it will often be possible to construct socially beneficial disclosure regimes. |
| spellingShingle | Cofone, IN Strandburg, KJ Strategic games and algorithmic secrecy |
| title | Strategic games and algorithmic secrecy |
| title_full | Strategic games and algorithmic secrecy |
| title_fullStr | Strategic games and algorithmic secrecy |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategic games and algorithmic secrecy |
| title_short | Strategic games and algorithmic secrecy |
| title_sort | strategic games and algorithmic secrecy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT cofonein strategicgamesandalgorithmicsecrecy AT strandburgkj strategicgamesandalgorithmicsecrecy |