| Summary: | Responds to the argument for unifying the defences of provocation and diminished responsibility as put forward by R.D. Mackay and B.J. Mitchell in Crim. L.R. 2003, 745-759. Refers to the authors' earlier critique of the House of Lords judgment in R. v Smith (Morgan James) in Crim. L.R. 2001, 623-635 in which it was argued that there is a fundamental incompatibility between offering an excuse and denying responsibility for murder, and their cautioning in M.L.R. 2001, 64(6), 815-830 against making the same kind of legal allowance for every kind of human disadvantage. Counters three specific criticisms of the authors made by Mackay and Mitchell, namely: (1) the latters' assertion that provocation is in fact a partial responsibility plea, implying that the defendant was not fully responsible for his actions; (2) that the authors were "naive" in wanting to "deny a defendant the chance of avoiding a murder conviction with its mandatory penalty...merely because he or she has an interest in maintaining self respect"; and (3) that the authors "perpetuate an unfortunate attitude to the mentally disordered" by attributing a stigma to a diminished responsibility verdict.
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