The love of truth
It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense-that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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2010
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| _version_ | 1797104286441668608 |
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| author | Hattiangadi, A |
| author_facet | Hattiangadi, A |
| author_sort | Hattiangadi, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense-that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation-it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, I argue that this view is untenable. The truth norm clashes with plausible evidential norms in a wide range of cases, such as when we have excellent but misleading evidence for a falsehood or no evidence for a truth. I will consider various ways to resolve this conflict and argue that none of them work. However, I will ultimately attempt to vindicate the love of truth, by arguing that knowledge is the proper epistemic goal. The upshot is that we should not aim merely to believe the truth; we should aim to know it. © 2010. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:31:43Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:f632eb36-974a-42ab-9e05-75a1efe4497f |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:31:43Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:f632eb36-974a-42ab-9e05-75a1efe4497f2022-03-27T12:33:21ZThe love of truthJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:f632eb36-974a-42ab-9e05-75a1efe4497fEnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2010Hattiangadi, AIt is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense-that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation-it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, I argue that this view is untenable. The truth norm clashes with plausible evidential norms in a wide range of cases, such as when we have excellent but misleading evidence for a falsehood or no evidence for a truth. I will consider various ways to resolve this conflict and argue that none of them work. However, I will ultimately attempt to vindicate the love of truth, by arguing that knowledge is the proper epistemic goal. The upshot is that we should not aim merely to believe the truth; we should aim to know it. © 2010. |
| spellingShingle | Hattiangadi, A The love of truth |
| title | The love of truth |
| title_full | The love of truth |
| title_fullStr | The love of truth |
| title_full_unstemmed | The love of truth |
| title_short | The love of truth |
| title_sort | love of truth |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hattiangadia theloveoftruth AT hattiangadia loveoftruth |