Bribing voters
We show how an outside party offering incentives to voters can manipulate at no cost collective decisions made through voting. Under influence, these decisions can become inefficient. Therefore, the market for policies may be more likely to fail than the markets for goods, because (democratic) polit...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2000
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| _version_ | 1797104416734576640 |
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| author | Bo, E |
| author_facet | Bo, E |
| author_sort | Bo, E |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We show how an outside party offering incentives to voters can manipulate at no cost collective decisions made through voting. Under influence, these decisions can become inefficient. Therefore, the market for policies may be more likely to fail than the markets for goods, because (democratic) politics involves influence and collective decisions to a greater extent than markets for goods do. We develop and use a model to analyze different incentive schemes, credibility situations, and payoff and information structures. We discuss implications for the efficiency of democracy, voting, lobbying, committee decision making, and legislatures. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:33:28Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:f6d17f89-5eb0-4530-8e1d-f74d28330a18 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:33:28Z |
| publishDate | 2000 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:f6d17f89-5eb0-4530-8e1d-f74d28330a182022-03-27T12:37:51ZBribing votersWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:f6d17f89-5eb0-4530-8e1d-f74d28330a18Bulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2000Bo, EWe show how an outside party offering incentives to voters can manipulate at no cost collective decisions made through voting. Under influence, these decisions can become inefficient. Therefore, the market for policies may be more likely to fail than the markets for goods, because (democratic) politics involves influence and collective decisions to a greater extent than markets for goods do. We develop and use a model to analyze different incentive schemes, credibility situations, and payoff and information structures. We discuss implications for the efficiency of democracy, voting, lobbying, committee decision making, and legislatures. |
| spellingShingle | Bo, E Bribing voters |
| title | Bribing voters |
| title_full | Bribing voters |
| title_fullStr | Bribing voters |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bribing voters |
| title_short | Bribing voters |
| title_sort | bribing voters |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT boe bribingvoters |