The condorcet principle for multiwinner elections: from shortlisting to proportionality
We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is stable if each committee member is preferred to each non-member by a (possibly weak) majority of voters. The second notion is called local...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Conference item |
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IJCAI
2017
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| _version_ | 1797104427648155648 |
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| author | Aziz, H Elkind, E Faliszewski, P Lackner, M Skowron, P |
| author_facet | Aziz, H Elkind, E Faliszewski, P Lackner, M Skowron, P |
| author_sort | Aziz, H |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is stable if each committee member is preferred to each non-member by a (possibly weak) majority of voters. The second notion is called local stability (introduced in this paper): A size-$k$ committee is locally stable in an election with $n$ voters if there is no candidate $c$ and no group of more than $\frac{n}{k+1}$ voters such that each voter in this group prefers $c$ to each committee member. We argue that Gehrlein-stable committees are appropriate for shortlisting tasks, and that locally stable committees are better suited for applications that require proportional representation. The goal of this paper is to analyze these notions in detail, explore their compatibility with notions of proportionality, and investigate the computational complexity of related algorithmic tasks. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:33:38Z |
| format | Conference item |
| id | oxford-uuid:f6e09764-dd5e-4485-9b39-4262a4e0d2de |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:33:38Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | IJCAI |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:f6e09764-dd5e-4485-9b39-4262a4e0d2de2022-03-27T12:38:16ZThe condorcet principle for multiwinner elections: from shortlisting to proportionalityConference itemhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794uuid:f6e09764-dd5e-4485-9b39-4262a4e0d2deSymplectic Elements at OxfordIJCAI2017Aziz, HElkind, EFaliszewski, PLackner, MSkowron, PWe study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is stable if each committee member is preferred to each non-member by a (possibly weak) majority of voters. The second notion is called local stability (introduced in this paper): A size-$k$ committee is locally stable in an election with $n$ voters if there is no candidate $c$ and no group of more than $\frac{n}{k+1}$ voters such that each voter in this group prefers $c$ to each committee member. We argue that Gehrlein-stable committees are appropriate for shortlisting tasks, and that locally stable committees are better suited for applications that require proportional representation. The goal of this paper is to analyze these notions in detail, explore their compatibility with notions of proportionality, and investigate the computational complexity of related algorithmic tasks. |
| spellingShingle | Aziz, H Elkind, E Faliszewski, P Lackner, M Skowron, P The condorcet principle for multiwinner elections: from shortlisting to proportionality |
| title | The condorcet principle for multiwinner elections: from shortlisting to proportionality |
| title_full | The condorcet principle for multiwinner elections: from shortlisting to proportionality |
| title_fullStr | The condorcet principle for multiwinner elections: from shortlisting to proportionality |
| title_full_unstemmed | The condorcet principle for multiwinner elections: from shortlisting to proportionality |
| title_short | The condorcet principle for multiwinner elections: from shortlisting to proportionality |
| title_sort | condorcet principle for multiwinner elections from shortlisting to proportionality |
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