Banking Licences, Bailouts and Regulator Ability
I analyse a model in which it is socially optimal for banks to manage depositor funds but in which concerns about fraud discourage depositing and justify regulation. The regulator screens bankers and decides the level of charter value which they will receive as incentive to prevent fraud. She can al...
第一著者: | Morrison, A |
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フォーマット: | Journal article |
出版事項: |
2004
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