Board structure, mergers, and shareholder wealth: a study of the mutual fund industry
We study mutual fund mergers between 1999 and 2001 to understand the role and effectiveness of fund boards. Some fund mergers—typically across-family mergers—benefit target shareholders but are costly to target fund directors. Such mergers are more likely when funds underperform and their boards hav...
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| Format: | Conference item |
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2004
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| _version_ | 1826305767245873152 |
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| author | Tufano, P Khorana, A Wedge, L |
| author_facet | Tufano, P Khorana, A Wedge, L |
| author_sort | Tufano, P |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We study mutual fund mergers between 1999 and 2001 to understand the role and effectiveness of fund boards. Some fund mergers—typically across-family mergers—benefit target shareholders but are costly to target fund directors. Such mergers are more likely when funds underperform and their boards have a larger percentage of independent trustees, suggesting that more-independent boards tolerate less underperformance before initiating across-family mergers. This effect is most pronounced when all of the fund's directors are independent, not the 75% level of independence required by the SEC. Higher-paid target fund boards are less likely to approve across-family mergers that cause substantial reductions in their compensation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:37:50Z |
| format | Conference item |
| id | oxford-uuid:f845044d-1ad1-4aa7-b1e2-5c7e52da5af1 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:37:50Z |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:f845044d-1ad1-4aa7-b1e2-5c7e52da5af12022-03-27T12:48:58ZBoard structure, mergers, and shareholder wealth: a study of the mutual fund industryConference itemhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794uuid:f845044d-1ad1-4aa7-b1e2-5c7e52da5af1Saïd Business School - Eureka2004Tufano, PKhorana, AWedge, LWe study mutual fund mergers between 1999 and 2001 to understand the role and effectiveness of fund boards. Some fund mergers—typically across-family mergers—benefit target shareholders but are costly to target fund directors. Such mergers are more likely when funds underperform and their boards have a larger percentage of independent trustees, suggesting that more-independent boards tolerate less underperformance before initiating across-family mergers. This effect is most pronounced when all of the fund's directors are independent, not the 75% level of independence required by the SEC. Higher-paid target fund boards are less likely to approve across-family mergers that cause substantial reductions in their compensation. |
| spellingShingle | Tufano, P Khorana, A Wedge, L Board structure, mergers, and shareholder wealth: a study of the mutual fund industry |
| title | Board structure, mergers, and shareholder wealth: a study of the mutual fund industry |
| title_full | Board structure, mergers, and shareholder wealth: a study of the mutual fund industry |
| title_fullStr | Board structure, mergers, and shareholder wealth: a study of the mutual fund industry |
| title_full_unstemmed | Board structure, mergers, and shareholder wealth: a study of the mutual fund industry |
| title_short | Board structure, mergers, and shareholder wealth: a study of the mutual fund industry |
| title_sort | board structure mergers and shareholder wealth a study of the mutual fund industry |
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