Dynamic Rawlsian policy

A well-known time-inconsistency problem hinders optimal decision-making when policymakers are constrained in their pesent choices by expectations of future outcomes. The time-inconsistency problem is caused by differences in the preferences of policymakers who exist at different points in time. Ad...

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Main Authors: Ellison, M, Brendon, C
Format: Working paper
Published: University of Oxford 2012
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author Ellison, M
Brendon, C
Ellison, M
author_facet Ellison, M
Brendon, C
Ellison, M
author_sort Ellison, M
collection OXFORD
description A well-known time-inconsistency problem hinders optimal decision-making when policymakers are constrained in their pesent choices by expectations of future outcomes. The time-inconsistency problem is caused by differences in the preferences of policymakers who exist at different points in time. Adapting the arguments of Rawls (1971), we propose that these differences can be eliminated if policy is set from behind a 'veil of ignorance', without knowledge of when the policy will be implemented. We set up a well-defined choice problem that captures this normative perspective. The policies that it generates have a number of appealing properties.
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spelling oxford-uuid:f9bbdf7f-4d93-4c36-93cc-db812f8c65442022-03-27T13:00:04ZDynamic Rawlsian policyWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:f9bbdf7f-4d93-4c36-93cc-db812f8c6544Symplectic ElementsBulk import via SwordUniversity of Oxford2012Ellison, MBrendon, CEllison, MA well-known time-inconsistency problem hinders optimal decision-making when policymakers are constrained in their pesent choices by expectations of future outcomes. The time-inconsistency problem is caused by differences in the preferences of policymakers who exist at different points in time. Adapting the arguments of Rawls (1971), we propose that these differences can be eliminated if policy is set from behind a 'veil of ignorance', without knowledge of when the policy will be implemented. We set up a well-defined choice problem that captures this normative perspective. The policies that it generates have a number of appealing properties.
spellingShingle Ellison, M
Brendon, C
Ellison, M
Dynamic Rawlsian policy
title Dynamic Rawlsian policy
title_full Dynamic Rawlsian policy
title_fullStr Dynamic Rawlsian policy
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic Rawlsian policy
title_short Dynamic Rawlsian policy
title_sort dynamic rawlsian policy
work_keys_str_mv AT ellisonm dynamicrawlsianpolicy
AT brendonc dynamicrawlsianpolicy
AT ellisonm dynamicrawlsianpolicy