Dynamic Rawlsian policy
A well-known time-inconsistency problem hinders optimal decision-making when policymakers are constrained in their pesent choices by expectations of future outcomes. The time-inconsistency problem is caused by differences in the preferences of policymakers who exist at different points in time. Ad...
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Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2012
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author | Ellison, M Brendon, C Ellison, M |
author_facet | Ellison, M Brendon, C Ellison, M |
author_sort | Ellison, M |
collection | OXFORD |
description | A well-known time-inconsistency problem hinders optimal decision-making when policymakers are constrained in their pesent choices by expectations of future outcomes. The time-inconsistency problem is caused by differences in the preferences of policymakers who exist at different points in time. Adapting the arguments of Rawls (1971), we propose that these differences can be eliminated if policy is set from behind a 'veil of ignorance', without knowledge of when the policy will be implemented. We set up a well-defined choice problem that captures this normative perspective. The policies that it generates have a number of appealing properties. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:42:22Z |
format | Working paper |
id | oxford-uuid:f9bbdf7f-4d93-4c36-93cc-db812f8c6544 |
institution | University of Oxford |
last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:42:22Z |
publishDate | 2012 |
publisher | University of Oxford |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:f9bbdf7f-4d93-4c36-93cc-db812f8c65442022-03-27T13:00:04ZDynamic Rawlsian policyWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:f9bbdf7f-4d93-4c36-93cc-db812f8c6544Symplectic ElementsBulk import via SwordUniversity of Oxford2012Ellison, MBrendon, CEllison, MA well-known time-inconsistency problem hinders optimal decision-making when policymakers are constrained in their pesent choices by expectations of future outcomes. The time-inconsistency problem is caused by differences in the preferences of policymakers who exist at different points in time. Adapting the arguments of Rawls (1971), we propose that these differences can be eliminated if policy is set from behind a 'veil of ignorance', without knowledge of when the policy will be implemented. We set up a well-defined choice problem that captures this normative perspective. The policies that it generates have a number of appealing properties. |
spellingShingle | Ellison, M Brendon, C Ellison, M Dynamic Rawlsian policy |
title | Dynamic Rawlsian policy |
title_full | Dynamic Rawlsian policy |
title_fullStr | Dynamic Rawlsian policy |
title_full_unstemmed | Dynamic Rawlsian policy |
title_short | Dynamic Rawlsian policy |
title_sort | dynamic rawlsian policy |
work_keys_str_mv | AT ellisonm dynamicrawlsianpolicy AT brendonc dynamicrawlsianpolicy AT ellisonm dynamicrawlsianpolicy |