Wittgenstein, criteria and the ineffability of consciousness
The present discussion seeks to determine the scope and nature of Wittgenstein's opposition to some prominent approaches to consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science. We begin with some general remarks about this opposition, and in Chapter 1 appraise some prominent...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | Maloney, J |
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Μορφή: | Thesis |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
2010
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Θέματα: |
Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
-
Borderline consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, and artificial consciousness: a unified approach
ανά: Chin, C
Έκδοση: (2015) -
Fragments of mind: a thesis on the subject of experience, the structure of consciousness, and split-brain patients
ανά: Lövgren, OSJK
Έκδοση: (2023) -
A hybrid naive realist-representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness
ανά: Mathers, D
Έκδοση: (2016) -
Perplexities of consciousness /
ανά: Schwitzgebel, Eric, author
Έκδοση: (c201) -
The nature of consciousness : philosophical debates /
ανά: Block, Ned Joel, 1942-, κ.ά.
Έκδοση: (1997)