Wittgenstein, criteria and the ineffability of consciousness
The present discussion seeks to determine the scope and nature of Wittgenstein's opposition to some prominent approaches to consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science. We begin with some general remarks about this opposition, and in Chapter 1 appraise some prominent...
Autor principal: | Maloney, J |
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Format: | Thesis |
Idioma: | English |
Publicat: |
2010
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Matèries: |
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