Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence.

We model the interplay between a government’s performance, its expected lifetime, and the confidence it enjoys. Here, “confidence” can be broadly interpreted as the government’s popularity, the size of its parliamentary majority, its reserve of talent, or other factors. Confidence evolves in respons...

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Main Authors: Myatt, D, Dewan, T
Format: Working paper
Language:English
Published: Department of Economics (University of Oxford) 2010
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author Myatt, D
Dewan, T
author_facet Myatt, D
Dewan, T
author_sort Myatt, D
collection OXFORD
description We model the interplay between a government’s performance, its expected lifetime, and the confidence it enjoys. Here, “confidence” can be broadly interpreted as the government’s popularity, the size of its parliamentary majority, its reserve of talent, or other factors. Confidence evolves in response to performance, and if it evaporates then the government falls. We analyze how confidence influences ministers’ behavior. A minister’s tenure is determined by the performance of both himself and others. He chooses higher performance when the government is expected to last, which is so when others perform well. Multiple equilibria arise: in an optimistic equilibrium, high performance sustains a government indefinitely; in a pessimistic equilibrium, the government’s expected demise is a self-fulfilling prophecy. When confidence evolves stochastically, however, there is a unique equilibrium in which a crisis of confidence begins if and only if negative shocks shift confidence below a critical threshold.
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spelling oxford-uuid:fcb068da-ac6e-4fd8-b427-8e03d1fe96362022-03-27T13:22:50ZDynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:fcb068da-ac6e-4fd8-b427-8e03d1fe9636EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2010Myatt, DDewan, TWe model the interplay between a government’s performance, its expected lifetime, and the confidence it enjoys. Here, “confidence” can be broadly interpreted as the government’s popularity, the size of its parliamentary majority, its reserve of talent, or other factors. Confidence evolves in response to performance, and if it evaporates then the government falls. We analyze how confidence influences ministers’ behavior. A minister’s tenure is determined by the performance of both himself and others. He chooses higher performance when the government is expected to last, which is so when others perform well. Multiple equilibria arise: in an optimistic equilibrium, high performance sustains a government indefinitely; in a pessimistic equilibrium, the government’s expected demise is a self-fulfilling prophecy. When confidence evolves stochastically, however, there is a unique equilibrium in which a crisis of confidence begins if and only if negative shocks shift confidence below a critical threshold.
spellingShingle Myatt, D
Dewan, T
Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence.
title Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence.
title_full Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence.
title_fullStr Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence.
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence.
title_short Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence.
title_sort dynamic government performance honeymoons and crises of confidence
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