Learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions.
In this paper we examine the optimal level of central bank activism in a standard model of monetary policy with uncertainty, learning and strategic interactions. We calibrate the model using G7 data and find that the presence of strategic interactions between the central bank and private agents crea...
Main Authors: | Ellison, M, Valla, N |
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Format: | Working paper |
Sprog: | English |
Udgivet: |
European Central Bank
2000
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Lignende værker
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Learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions.
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