The Specification of Diagnosis-Related Groups.
Suppliers who are better informed than purchasers, such as physicians treating insured patients, often have discretion over what to provide. This paper shows how, when the purchaser observes what is supplied but neither recipient type nor the actual cost incurred, optimal provision differs from what...
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| Format: | Working paper |
| Language: | English |
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Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2003
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| _version_ | 1797105802159325184 |
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| author | Malcomson, J |
| author_facet | Malcomson, J |
| author_sort | Malcomson, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Suppliers who are better informed than purchasers, such as physicians treating insured patients, often have discretion over what to provide. This paper shows how, when the purchaser observes what is supplied but neither recipient type nor the actual cost incurred, optimal provision differs from what would be efficient if the purchaser had full information, whether or not the supplier can extract informational rent. The analysis is applied to, among other things, data on tests for coronary artery disease and to Medicare diagnosis-related groups defined by the treatment given, not just the diagnosis, illustrating the biases in provision that result. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:52:35Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:fd098209-4e70-408c-982f-643bf8a13a87 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:52:35Z |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publisher | Department of Economics (University of Oxford) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:fd098209-4e70-408c-982f-643bf8a13a872022-03-27T13:25:45ZThe Specification of Diagnosis-Related Groups.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:fd098209-4e70-408c-982f-643bf8a13a87EnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2003Malcomson, JSuppliers who are better informed than purchasers, such as physicians treating insured patients, often have discretion over what to provide. This paper shows how, when the purchaser observes what is supplied but neither recipient type nor the actual cost incurred, optimal provision differs from what would be efficient if the purchaser had full information, whether or not the supplier can extract informational rent. The analysis is applied to, among other things, data on tests for coronary artery disease and to Medicare diagnosis-related groups defined by the treatment given, not just the diagnosis, illustrating the biases in provision that result. |
| spellingShingle | Malcomson, J The Specification of Diagnosis-Related Groups. |
| title | The Specification of Diagnosis-Related Groups. |
| title_full | The Specification of Diagnosis-Related Groups. |
| title_fullStr | The Specification of Diagnosis-Related Groups. |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Specification of Diagnosis-Related Groups. |
| title_short | The Specification of Diagnosis-Related Groups. |
| title_sort | specification of diagnosis related groups |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT malcomsonj thespecificationofdiagnosisrelatedgroups AT malcomsonj specificationofdiagnosisrelatedgroups |