Conceivability and metaphysical possibility
<p>David Chalmers maintains that certain kinds of conceivability are reliable guides to metaphysical possibility. In this essay, I argue that Chalmers is wrong about the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility. I begin by explaining the notion of metaphysical possibili...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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2008
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| _version_ | 1826306895529377792 |
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| author | Lin, E |
| author2 | Williamson, T |
| author_facet | Williamson, T Lin, E |
| author_sort | Lin, E |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>David Chalmers maintains that certain kinds of conceivability are reliable guides to metaphysical possibility. In this essay, I argue that Chalmers is wrong about the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility. I begin by explaining the notion of metaphysical possibility and by distinguishing it from those of other kinds of so-called possibility (including epistemic, logical, conceptual, physical, and natural possibility). I then explain Chalmers’s view on the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility—a view that he calls <em>modal rationalism</em>. Next, I examine his positive case for his view, and I argue that it is unpersuasive. In particular, I argue, his attempt to show that modal rationalism is <em>a priori</em> is clearly a failure: given a proper understanding of the notion of metaphysical possibility, the balance of reasons overwhelming favors the hypothesis that modal rationalism is not <em>a priori</em>, and we are entitled to assume that it is not a priori unless compelling reasons to think otherwise are revealed. Finally, I produce two arguments that show that because modal rationalism is not <em>a priori</em>, it is false. I conclude that since there is every reason to think that modal rationalism is not a priori and no plausible reason to think that it is <em>a priori</em>, and since the falsity of modal rationalism follows from its not being a priori, there is every reason to think that modal rationalism is false.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:54:50Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:fdc3935c-1529-4140-9ee1-0c43edb513aa |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:54:50Z |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:fdc3935c-1529-4140-9ee1-0c43edb513aa2022-03-27T13:31:23ZConceivability and metaphysical possibilityThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_7a1fuuid:fdc3935c-1529-4140-9ee1-0c43edb513aaPhilosophyMetaphysicsEnglishOxford University Research Archive - Valet2008Lin, EWilliamson, THawthorne, J<p>David Chalmers maintains that certain kinds of conceivability are reliable guides to metaphysical possibility. In this essay, I argue that Chalmers is wrong about the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility. I begin by explaining the notion of metaphysical possibility and by distinguishing it from those of other kinds of so-called possibility (including epistemic, logical, conceptual, physical, and natural possibility). I then explain Chalmers’s view on the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility—a view that he calls <em>modal rationalism</em>. Next, I examine his positive case for his view, and I argue that it is unpersuasive. In particular, I argue, his attempt to show that modal rationalism is <em>a priori</em> is clearly a failure: given a proper understanding of the notion of metaphysical possibility, the balance of reasons overwhelming favors the hypothesis that modal rationalism is not <em>a priori</em>, and we are entitled to assume that it is not a priori unless compelling reasons to think otherwise are revealed. Finally, I produce two arguments that show that because modal rationalism is not <em>a priori</em>, it is false. I conclude that since there is every reason to think that modal rationalism is not a priori and no plausible reason to think that it is <em>a priori</em>, and since the falsity of modal rationalism follows from its not being a priori, there is every reason to think that modal rationalism is false.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Metaphysics Lin, E Conceivability and metaphysical possibility |
| title | Conceivability and metaphysical possibility |
| title_full | Conceivability and metaphysical possibility |
| title_fullStr | Conceivability and metaphysical possibility |
| title_full_unstemmed | Conceivability and metaphysical possibility |
| title_short | Conceivability and metaphysical possibility |
| title_sort | conceivability and metaphysical possibility |
| topic | Philosophy Metaphysics |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT line conceivabilityandmetaphysicalpossibility |