X-phi and Carnapian explication
The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conce...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Springer Netherlands
2015
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| _version_ | 1797106039359799296 |
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| author | Shepherd, J Justus, J |
| author_facet | Shepherd, J Justus, J |
| author_sort | Shepherd, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philosophers (experimental and otherwise) are essentially normative. With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:56:01Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:fe2b6c34-ee66-4fd6-be39-6f54204661f7 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T06:56:01Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Springer Netherlands |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:fe2b6c34-ee66-4fd6-be39-6f54204661f72022-03-27T13:34:17ZX-phi and Carnapian explicationJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:fe2b6c34-ee66-4fd6-be39-6f54204661f7Symplectic Elements at OxfordSpringer Netherlands2015Shepherd, JJustus, JThe rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philosophers (experimental and otherwise) are essentially normative. With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains. |
| spellingShingle | Shepherd, J Justus, J X-phi and Carnapian explication |
| title | X-phi and Carnapian explication |
| title_full | X-phi and Carnapian explication |
| title_fullStr | X-phi and Carnapian explication |
| title_full_unstemmed | X-phi and Carnapian explication |
| title_short | X-phi and Carnapian explication |
| title_sort | x phi and carnapian explication |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT shepherdj xphiandcarnapianexplication AT justusj xphiandcarnapianexplication |