Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines
We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as...
主要な著者: | Vulkan, N, Hurkens, S |
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フォーマット: | Working paper |
出版事項: |
University of Oxford
2006
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