Human Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical Essay

I am sceptical as to the contribution that human rights can make to our evaluation of medical law. I will argue here that viewing medical law through a human rights framework provides no greater clarity, insight or focus. If anything, human rights reasoning clouds any bioethical or evaluative analys...

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Main Author: Wall, J
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2015
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author Wall, J
author_facet Wall, J
author_sort Wall, J
collection OXFORD
description I am sceptical as to the contribution that human rights can make to our evaluation of medical law. I will argue here that viewing medical law through a human rights framework provides no greater clarity, insight or focus. If anything, human rights reasoning clouds any bioethical or evaluative analysis. In Section 1 of this article, I outline the general structure of human rights reasoning. I will describe human rights reasoning as (a) reasoning from rights that each person has 'by virtue of their humanity', (b) reasoning from rights that provide 'hard to defeat' reasons for action and (c) reasoning from abstract norms to specified duties. I will then argue in Section 2 that, unless we (a) re-conceive of human rights as narrow categories of liberties, it becomes (b) necessary for our human rights reasoning to gauge the normative force of each claim or liberty. When we apply this approach to disputes in medical law, we (in the best case scenario) end up (c) 'looking straight through' the human right to the (disagreement about) values and features that each person has by virtue of their humanity. © 2014 John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
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spelling oxford-uuid:ff3e9543-84b1-432c-ad47-6cc713f2d7c12022-03-27T13:43:21ZHuman Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical EssayJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:ff3e9543-84b1-432c-ad47-6cc713f2d7c1EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordWiley2015Wall, JI am sceptical as to the contribution that human rights can make to our evaluation of medical law. I will argue here that viewing medical law through a human rights framework provides no greater clarity, insight or focus. If anything, human rights reasoning clouds any bioethical or evaluative analysis. In Section 1 of this article, I outline the general structure of human rights reasoning. I will describe human rights reasoning as (a) reasoning from rights that each person has 'by virtue of their humanity', (b) reasoning from rights that provide 'hard to defeat' reasons for action and (c) reasoning from abstract norms to specified duties. I will then argue in Section 2 that, unless we (a) re-conceive of human rights as narrow categories of liberties, it becomes (b) necessary for our human rights reasoning to gauge the normative force of each claim or liberty. When we apply this approach to disputes in medical law, we (in the best case scenario) end up (c) 'looking straight through' the human right to the (disagreement about) values and features that each person has by virtue of their humanity. © 2014 John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
spellingShingle Wall, J
Human Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical Essay
title Human Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical Essay
title_full Human Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical Essay
title_fullStr Human Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical Essay
title_full_unstemmed Human Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical Essay
title_short Human Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical Essay
title_sort human rights reasoning and medical law a sceptical essay
work_keys_str_mv AT wallj humanrightsreasoningandmedicallawascepticalessay