Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions.
Starting from an example of the Allies’ decision to feint at Calais and attack Normandy on D-Day, this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies. Allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players’ responses to it yields a sensible account...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
AEA
2003
|
| _version_ | 1797106417088331776 |
|---|---|
| author | Crawford, V |
| author_facet | Crawford, V |
| author_sort | Crawford, V |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Starting from an example of the Allies’ decision to feint at Calais and attack Normandy on D-Day, this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies. Allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players’ responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless, noiseless messages. In some leading cases, the model has generically unique pure-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players, but are not themselves fooled. In others, the model has generically essentially unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players’ strategies protect all players from exploitation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:02:08Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:ffdb6fb0-cf6a-483e-8a9b-4cd2f22d9268 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:02:08Z |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publisher | AEA |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:ffdb6fb0-cf6a-483e-8a9b-4cd2f22d92682022-03-27T13:48:10ZLying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions. Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:ffdb6fb0-cf6a-483e-8a9b-4cd2f22d9268EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsAEA2003Crawford, VStarting from an example of the Allies’ decision to feint at Calais and attack Normandy on D-Day, this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies. Allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players’ responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless, noiseless messages. In some leading cases, the model has generically unique pure-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players, but are not themselves fooled. In others, the model has generically essentially unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players’ strategies protect all players from exploitation. |
| spellingShingle | Crawford, V Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions. |
| title | Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions.
|
| title_full | Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions.
|
| title_fullStr | Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions.
|
| title_full_unstemmed | Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions.
|
| title_short | Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions.
|
| title_sort | lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT crawfordv lyingforstrategicadvantagerationalandboundedlyrationalmisrepresentationofintentions |