Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions.
Starting from an example of the Allies’ decision to feint at Calais and attack Normandy on D-Day, this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies. Allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players’ responses to it yields a sensible account...
Príomhchruthaitheoir: | Crawford, V |
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Formáid: | Journal article |
Teanga: | English |
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
AEA
2003
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