Blockholders and corporate monitoring costs: evidence from Malaysia
This paper examines the effect of outside block-holders’ ownership on the demand for corporate monitoring in relation to agency theory in the Malaysian business environment. The results of this study provide evidence that, given the cultural differences, the agents and the principals may act differ...
Main Authors: | Mustapha, Mazlina, Che Ahmad, Ayoib |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Faculty of Economics and Management, Universiti Putra Malaysia
2013
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Online Access: | http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/30855/1/Blockholders%20and%20Corporate%20Monitoring%20Costs.pdf |
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