An evasion game model for duopoly competition

Based on the Bertrand and Cournot economic models, we develop an evasion game model for a duopoly market with two players competing on price and quantity. We show that if the total financial strength of first mover is greater than that of the second mover, and the first mover observes the second mov...

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Main Authors: Eslaminosratabadi, H., Salimi, M., Ibragimov, Gafurjan Ismailovich, Amini, M.
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universiti Putra Malaysia Press 2013
Online Access:http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/39769/1/82.%20An%20Evasion%20Game%20Model%20for%20Duopoly%20Competition.pdf
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author Eslaminosratabadi, H.
Salimi, M.
Ibragimov, Gafurjan Ismailovich
Amini, M.
author_facet Eslaminosratabadi, H.
Salimi, M.
Ibragimov, Gafurjan Ismailovich
Amini, M.
author_sort Eslaminosratabadi, H.
collection UPM
description Based on the Bertrand and Cournot economic models, we develop an evasion game model for a duopoly market with two players competing on price and quantity. We show that if the total financial strength of first mover is greater than that of the second mover, and the first mover observes the second mover perfectly, our proposed optimal strategy can be followed by the first mover to remain the market leader ahead of all competition.
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spelling upm.eprints-397692015-12-02T01:39:53Z http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/39769/ An evasion game model for duopoly competition Eslaminosratabadi, H. Salimi, M. Ibragimov, Gafurjan Ismailovich Amini, M. Based on the Bertrand and Cournot economic models, we develop an evasion game model for a duopoly market with two players competing on price and quantity. We show that if the total financial strength of first mover is greater than that of the second mover, and the first mover observes the second mover perfectly, our proposed optimal strategy can be followed by the first mover to remain the market leader ahead of all competition. Universiti Putra Malaysia Press 2013-09 Article PeerReviewed application/pdf en http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/39769/1/82.%20An%20Evasion%20Game%20Model%20for%20Duopoly%20Competition.pdf Eslaminosratabadi, H. and Salimi, M. and Ibragimov, Gafurjan Ismailovich and Amini, M. (2013) An evasion game model for duopoly competition. Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities, 21 (3). pp. 1083-1091. ISSN 0128-7702; ESSN: 2231-8534 http://www.pertanika.upm.edu.my/Pertanika%20PAPERS/JSSH%20Vol.%2021%20(3)%20Sep.%202013/14%20Page%201083-1092.pdf
spellingShingle Eslaminosratabadi, H.
Salimi, M.
Ibragimov, Gafurjan Ismailovich
Amini, M.
An evasion game model for duopoly competition
title An evasion game model for duopoly competition
title_full An evasion game model for duopoly competition
title_fullStr An evasion game model for duopoly competition
title_full_unstemmed An evasion game model for duopoly competition
title_short An evasion game model for duopoly competition
title_sort evasion game model for duopoly competition
url http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/39769/1/82.%20An%20Evasion%20Game%20Model%20for%20Duopoly%20Competition.pdf
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