It pays to be an executive in Malaysia

Malaysian corporate sector is characterized by an insider system of corporate governance and induced the alignment problems between majority shareholders and the minority group.This paper investigates if there is an evidence of moral hazard behaviour being practiced in the executive remuneration dec...

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Main Authors: Ghazali, Zahiruddin, Md. Taib, Fauziah
Format: Article
Published: Tennessee State University College of Business 2015
Subjects:
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author Ghazali, Zahiruddin
Md. Taib, Fauziah
author_facet Ghazali, Zahiruddin
Md. Taib, Fauziah
author_sort Ghazali, Zahiruddin
collection UUM
description Malaysian corporate sector is characterized by an insider system of corporate governance and induced the alignment problems between majority shareholders and the minority group.This paper investigates if there is an evidence of moral hazard behaviour being practiced in the executive remuneration decision. A match pair methodology is employed to isolate the effect of ESOS adoption from the usual motivations when deciding executive remunerations. Results suggest that while the amount of remuneration is directly linked to size of firms suggesting efficient and rational decision rather than on performance (profitability).The moral hazard behaviour is more evident when firms reward their executives even more in times of lower profitability or more losses over a longer period.The practice is more apparent among family owned firms not adopting ESOS. Though there is evidence of weak monitoring by government, it is not enough to ward off the insider pressures for personal gains.
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spelling uum-154082016-04-13T04:56:52Z https://repo.uum.edu.my/id/eprint/15408/ It pays to be an executive in Malaysia Ghazali, Zahiruddin Md. Taib, Fauziah HD28 Management. Industrial Management Malaysian corporate sector is characterized by an insider system of corporate governance and induced the alignment problems between majority shareholders and the minority group.This paper investigates if there is an evidence of moral hazard behaviour being practiced in the executive remuneration decision. A match pair methodology is employed to isolate the effect of ESOS adoption from the usual motivations when deciding executive remunerations. Results suggest that while the amount of remuneration is directly linked to size of firms suggesting efficient and rational decision rather than on performance (profitability).The moral hazard behaviour is more evident when firms reward their executives even more in times of lower profitability or more losses over a longer period.The practice is more apparent among family owned firms not adopting ESOS. Though there is evidence of weak monitoring by government, it is not enough to ward off the insider pressures for personal gains. Tennessee State University College of Business 2015 Article PeerReviewed Ghazali, Zahiruddin and Md. Taib, Fauziah (2015) It pays to be an executive in Malaysia. The Journal of Developing Areas, 49 (5). pp. 225-237. ISSN 1548-2278 http://doi.org/10.1353/jda.2015.0047 doi:10.1353/jda.2015.0047 doi:10.1353/jda.2015.0047
spellingShingle HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Ghazali, Zahiruddin
Md. Taib, Fauziah
It pays to be an executive in Malaysia
title It pays to be an executive in Malaysia
title_full It pays to be an executive in Malaysia
title_fullStr It pays to be an executive in Malaysia
title_full_unstemmed It pays to be an executive in Malaysia
title_short It pays to be an executive in Malaysia
title_sort it pays to be an executive in malaysia
topic HD28 Management. Industrial Management
work_keys_str_mv AT ghazalizahiruddin itpaystobeanexecutiveinmalaysia
AT mdtaibfauziah itpaystobeanexecutiveinmalaysia