Board chairmen’s involvement in the nomination and remuneration committees and earnings management
The attention given by regulators, investors and financial community to the issue of financial scandals has increased over the past decades (Bowen, Freidank, Wannow, & Cavallone, 2017). Among the reasons for these scandals is earnings management (EM), where experience has shown that companies th...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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2018
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| Online Access: | https://repo.uum.edu.my/id/eprint/26358/1/AABFJ%2012%204%202018%2060%2076.pdf |
| _version_ | 1803629111342530560 |
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| author | Al-Absy, Mujeeb Saif Mohsen Ku Ismail, Ku Nor Izah Chandren, Sitraselvi |
| author_facet | Al-Absy, Mujeeb Saif Mohsen Ku Ismail, Ku Nor Izah Chandren, Sitraselvi |
| author_sort | Al-Absy, Mujeeb Saif Mohsen |
| collection | UUM |
| description | The attention given by regulators, investors and financial community to the issue of financial scandals has increased over the past decades (Bowen, Freidank, Wannow, & Cavallone, 2017). Among the reasons for these scandals is earnings management (EM), where experience has shown that companies that engage in EM (e.g., creative accounting), often end up committing fraud (Jones, 2011). Basically, EM is an accounting treatment to alter the earnings result in the financial statements (Chandren, 2016; Chandren, Ahmad, & Ali, 2015), either by using the accrual earnings management (AEM) or real earnings management (REM) (Chandren, Ahmad, & Ali, 2017). Therefore, the occurrence of EM practice motivates managers to commit fraud in the future rather than EM (Perols & Lougee, 2011; Sulaiman, Danbatta, & Rahman, 2014). More importantly, the EM problem is not new (Levitt, 1998); it has however increased due to the market growth that is challenging for companies that do not meet investors’ expectations (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Levitt, 1998). Thus, managers become more likely to report opportunistically to match peer performance (Du & Shen, 2018). |
| first_indexed | 2024-07-04T06:32:39Z |
| format | Article |
| id | uum-26358 |
| institution | Universiti Utara Malaysia |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-07-04T06:32:39Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | uum-263582019-08-28T06:40:28Z https://repo.uum.edu.my/id/eprint/26358/ Board chairmen’s involvement in the nomination and remuneration committees and earnings management Al-Absy, Mujeeb Saif Mohsen Ku Ismail, Ku Nor Izah Chandren, Sitraselvi HF5601 Accounting The attention given by regulators, investors and financial community to the issue of financial scandals has increased over the past decades (Bowen, Freidank, Wannow, & Cavallone, 2017). Among the reasons for these scandals is earnings management (EM), where experience has shown that companies that engage in EM (e.g., creative accounting), often end up committing fraud (Jones, 2011). Basically, EM is an accounting treatment to alter the earnings result in the financial statements (Chandren, 2016; Chandren, Ahmad, & Ali, 2015), either by using the accrual earnings management (AEM) or real earnings management (REM) (Chandren, Ahmad, & Ali, 2017). Therefore, the occurrence of EM practice motivates managers to commit fraud in the future rather than EM (Perols & Lougee, 2011; Sulaiman, Danbatta, & Rahman, 2014). More importantly, the EM problem is not new (Levitt, 1998); it has however increased due to the market growth that is challenging for companies that do not meet investors’ expectations (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Levitt, 1998). Thus, managers become more likely to report opportunistically to match peer performance (Du & Shen, 2018). 2018 Article PeerReviewed application/pdf en https://repo.uum.edu.my/id/eprint/26358/1/AABFJ%2012%204%202018%2060%2076.pdf Al-Absy, Mujeeb Saif Mohsen and Ku Ismail, Ku Nor Izah and Chandren, Sitraselvi (2018) Board chairmen’s involvement in the nomination and remuneration committees and earnings management. Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 12 (4). pp. 60-76. ISSN 18342000 http://doi.org/10.14453/aabfj.v12i4.5 doi:10.14453/aabfj.v12i4.5 doi:10.14453/aabfj.v12i4.5 |
| spellingShingle | HF5601 Accounting Al-Absy, Mujeeb Saif Mohsen Ku Ismail, Ku Nor Izah Chandren, Sitraselvi Board chairmen’s involvement in the nomination and remuneration committees and earnings management |
| title | Board chairmen’s involvement in the nomination and remuneration committees and earnings management |
| title_full | Board chairmen’s involvement in the nomination and remuneration committees and earnings management |
| title_fullStr | Board chairmen’s involvement in the nomination and remuneration committees and earnings management |
| title_full_unstemmed | Board chairmen’s involvement in the nomination and remuneration committees and earnings management |
| title_short | Board chairmen’s involvement in the nomination and remuneration committees and earnings management |
| title_sort | board chairmen s involvement in the nomination and remuneration committees and earnings management |
| topic | HF5601 Accounting |
| url | https://repo.uum.edu.my/id/eprint/26358/1/AABFJ%2012%204%202018%2060%2076.pdf |
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