OWA-based extensions of the Chamberlin–Courant rule by Elkind, E, Ismaili, A

“…The joint utility is typically identified either with the sum of all voters’ utilities or with the utility of the least satisfied voter, resulting in, respectively, the utilitarian and the egalitarian variant of the Chamberlin–Courant’s rule. …”

The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates. by Skowron, P, Yu, L, Faliszewski, P, Elkind, E

“…We then consider elections that are both single-peaked and single-crossing, and develop an efficient algorithm for the egalitarian variant of Monroe's rule for such elections. …”

The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates by Skowron, P, Yu, L, Faliszewski, P, Elkind, E

“…We then consider elections that are both single-peaked and single-crossing, and develop an efficient algorithm for the egalitarian variant of Monroe's rule for such elections. …”

Preferences single-peaked on a tree: Multiwinner elections and structural results by Peters, D, Yu, L, Chan, H, Elkind, E

“…We show that in this setting the egalitarian version of this rule admits a polynomial-time winner determination algorithm. …”