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1
Spontaneous Market Emergence.
Published 2002“…Reputational equilibria in which cheaters are permanently excluded are not decentralizable unless contracting is already developed and breach of contract is interpreted as a sign of impending bankruptcy.…”
Journal article -
2
Les institutions de marche en Afrique subsaharienne. (With English summary.)
Published 2005“…But decentralized exclusion can arise if breach of contract is interpreted as a signal of impending bankruptcy. I discuss the circulation of information about type and behavior, which is fraught with incentive problems, and the role of networks in shaping market interaction.…”
Journal article -
3
Spontaneous market emergence
Published 2003“…Reputational equilibria in which cheaters are permanently excluded from trade are not decentralizable unless markets are already developed and breach of contract is interpreted as a sign of impending bankruptcy. Market emergence is a path dependent process.…”
Working paper -
4
Spontaneous Market Emergence.
Published 2003“…Reputational equilibria in which cheaters are permanently excluded from trade are not decentralizable unless markets are already developed and breach of contract is interpreted as a sign of impending bankruptcy. Market emergence is a path dependent process.…”
Working paper