Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory by Block, Juan I., Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K.

“…When agents observe only the aggregate distribution of payoffs and recall only information from the last period, aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium for generic games, and pure equilibria are generally more stable than mixed equilibria. …”
Get full text

Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning by Fudenberg, Drew, Lanzani, Giacomo, Strack, Philipp

“…When the agent believes the outcome distribution is exogenous, every uniformly strict Berk–Nash equilibrium has positive probability of being the long‐run outcome for any initial belief. …”
Get full text

Robust Predictions in Infinite-Horizon Games--an Unrefinable Folk Theorem by Weinstein, Jonathan, Yildiz, Muhamet

“…We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action ai is played by a type ti in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of ti for which ai is the only rationalizable plan and whose unique rationalizable belief regarding the play of the game is arbitrarily close to the equilibrium belief of ti. …”
Get full text
Get full text

The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games by Sugaya, Takuo, Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg

“…For general multistage games, we establish that an outcome is implementable in SE if and only if it is implementable in a canonical Nash equilibrium in which players never take codominated actions. …”
Get full text

Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games by Weinstein, Jonathan, Yildiz, Muhamet

“…Without making any “richness” assumption, we characterize the sensitivity of any given Bayesian Nash equilibrium to higher-order beliefs. That is, for each type, we characterize the set of actions that can be played in equilibrium by some type whose lower-order beliefs are all as in the original type. …”
Get full text
Get full text

Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies by Clark, Daniel, Fudenberg, Drew, Wolitzky, Alexander

“…Here, we focus on the prisoner’s dilemma and restrict attention to strict equilibria that are coordination-proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game induced by their records and expected continuation payoffs. …”
Get full text