Dynamic Belief Elicitation by Chambers, Christopher P., Lambert, Nicolas S.

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Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs” by Kajii, Atsushi, Morris, Stephen

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Common belief foundations of global games by Morris, Stephen, Shin, Hyun Song, Yildiz, Muhamet

“…We characterize rationalizable actions in terms of the properties of the belief hierarchies and show that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, defined as the probability the players assign to their payoff parameters being higher than their opponents'. …”
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A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs by Brunnermeier, Markus K., Simsek, Alp, Xiong, Wei

“…This article proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs. Instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct, our criterion asserts that an allocation is belief-neutral efficient (inefficient) if it is efficient (inefficient) under any convex combination of agents’ beliefs. …”
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Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs by Fudenberg, Drew, Kamada, Yuichiro

“…In principle this allows different agents in the same player role to have different beliefs and play differently, and this is known to occur in laboratory experiments. …”
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Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey by Kajii, Atsushi, Morris, Stephen

“…Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) of standard normal form refinements such as perfection, and to relate refinements both to the “higher-order beliefs literature” (Rubinstein in Am Econ Rev 79:385–391, 1989; Monderer and Samet in Games Econ Behav 1:170–190, 1989; Morris et al. in Econ J Econ Soc 63:145–157, 1995; Kajii and Morris in Econ J Econ Soc 65:1283–1309, 1997a) and the “payoff uncertainty approach” (Fudenberg et al. in J Econ Theory 44:354–380, 1988; Dekel and Fudenberg in J Econ Theory 52:243–267, 1990).…”
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Incomplete information, higher-order beliefs and price inertia by Angeletos, George-Marios, La'O, Jennifer

“…We highlight the distinct role of higher-order beliefs with three extensions of our baseline model, all of which break the tight connection between the precision of information and higher-order beliefs featured in previous work.…”
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Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games by Weinstein, Jonathan, Yildiz, Muhamet

“…Without making any “richness” assumption, we characterize the sensitivity of any given Bayesian Nash equilibrium to higher-order beliefs. That is, for each type, we characterize the set of actions that can be played in equilibrium by some type whose lower-order beliefs are all as in the original type. …”
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Effect of Physician-Delivered COVID-19 Public Health Messages and Messages Acknowledging Racial Inequity on Black and White Adults’ Knowledge, Beliefs, and Practices Related to COVID-19 by Torres, Carlos, Ogbu-Nwobodo, Lucy, Alsan, Marcella, Cody Stanford, Fatima, Banerjee, Abhijit, Breza, Emily, Chandrasekhar, Arun G., Eichmeyer, Sarah, Karnani, Mohit, Loisel, Tristan, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Paul, Olken, Benjamin A., Vautrey, Pierre-Luc, Warner, Erica, Duflo, Esther, COVID-19 Working Group

“…Main Outcomes and Measures Knowledge, beliefs, and practices related to COVID-19, demand for information, willingness to pay for masks, and self-reported behavior. …”
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Financial Innovation and Portfolio Risks by Simsek, Alp

“…When belief disagreements are large, both types of innovation increase portfolio risks. …”
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Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning by Fudenberg, Drew, Lanzani, Giacomo, Strack, Philipp

“…We study how an agent learns from endogenous data when their prior belief is misspecified. We show that only uniform Berk–Nash equilibria can be long‐run outcomes, and that all uniformly strict Berk–Nash equilibria have an arbitrarily high probability of being the long‐run outcome for some initial beliefs. …”
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Monetary Policy with Opinionated Markets by Caballero, Ricardo J, Simsek, Alp

“…Announcements that reveal an unexpected change in the Fed’s belief provide a microfoundation for monetary policy shocks. …”
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Robust Predictions in Infinite-Horizon Games--an Unrefinable Folk Theorem by Weinstein, Jonathan, Yildiz, Muhamet

“…We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action ai is played by a type ti in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of ti for which ai is the only rationalizable plan and whose unique rationalizable belief regarding the play of the game is arbitrarily close to the equilibrium belief of ti. …”
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Speculation and Risk Sharing with New Financial Assets by Simsek, Alp

“…I investigate the effect of financial innovation on portfolio risks when traders have belief disagreements. I decompose traders’ average portfolio risks into two components: the uninsurable variance, defined as portfolio risks that would obtain without belief disagreements, and the speculative variance, defined as portfolio risks that result from speculation. …”
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Opinion fluctuations and persistent disagreement in social networks by Acemoglu, Daron, Como, Giacomo, Fagnani, Fabio, Ozdaglar, Asuman E.

“…Instead, beliefs in the society almost surely fail to converge, the belief profile keeps on oscillating in an ergodic fashion, and it converges in law to a non-degenerate random vector. …”
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Should retail investors’ leverage be limited? by Heimer, Rawley, Simsek, Alp

“…These results suggest the policy improves belief-neutral social welfare without reducing market liquidity.…”
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Active learning with a misspecified prior by Fudenberg, Drew, Romanyuk, Gleb, Strack, Philipp

“…We study learning and information acquisition by a Bayesian agent whose prior belief is misspecified in the sense that it assigns probability 0 to the true state of the world. …”
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Communication With Unknown Perspectives by Yildiz, Muhamet

“…Consider a group of individuals with unobservable perspectives (subjective prior beliefs) about a sequence of states. In each period, each individual receives private information about the current state and forms an opinion (a posterior belief). …”
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Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks by Acemoglu, Daron, Ozdaglar, Asuman E.

“…We provide an overview of recent research on belief and opinion dynamics in social networks. We discuss both Bayesian and non-Bayesian models of social learning and focus on the implications of the form of learning (e.g., Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian), the sources of information (e.g., observation vs. communication), and the structure of social networks in which individuals are situated on three key questions: (1) whether social learning will lead to consensus, i.e., to agreement among individuals starting with diff erent views; (2) whether social learning will effectively aggregate dispersed information and thus weed out incorrect beliefs; (3) whether media sources, prominent agents, politicians and the state will be able to manipulate beliefs and spread misinformation in a society.…”
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A Risk-Centric Model of Demand Recessions and Speculation* by Caballero, Ricardo J, Simsek, Alp

“…In the ex ante boom phase, belief disagreements (or heterogeneous asset valuations) matter because they induce investors to speculate. …”
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