Dynamic service selection and bandwidth allocation in IEEE 802.16m mobile relay networks by Zhu, Kun, Niyato, Dusit, Wang, Ping

“…At the upper level, a differential game is formulated for a dynamic bandwidth allocation of base stations and a closed-loop Nash equilibrium is obtained as the solution. Viewing the fluctuation of traffic flow rate as disturbance, the robust bandwidth allocation strategy design is performed. …”
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Cooperative transmission for meter data collection in smart grid by Niyato, Dusit, Wang, Ping

“…To analyze the relay transmission strategy of the community, the noncooperative game model is formulated, and the Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution. The proposed network architecture and analysis will be useful for the design and optimization of a wireless network for smart grid.…”
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A hierarchical framework of dynamic relay selection for mobile users and profit maximization for service providers in wireless relay networks by Li, Yifan, Wang, Ping, Niyato, Dusit, Zhuang, Weihua

“…At the upper level, we study the game of setting relay prices for the service providers, with the knowledge that the mobile users will make relay selections based on their given prices. Nash equilibrium is obtained as the solution. Our results can help to provide a guidance for service providers to compete for providing relay services.…”
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A novel joint dataset and incentive management mechanism for federated learning over MEC by Lee, Joohyung, Kim, Daejin, Niyato, Dusit

“…Using backward induction, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium among MDs, and then examine the Stackelberg equilibrium by analyzing the leader game. …”
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Dynamics in coded edge computing for IoT: a fractional evolutionary game approach by Han, Yue, Niyato, Dusit, Leung, Cyril, Miao, Chunyan, Kim, Dong In

“…In this article, we propose 'coded edge federation' (CEF), in which different EIPs collaboratively provide edge resources for CDC tasks. To study the Nash equilibrium, when no EIP has an incentive to unilaterally alter its decision on edge resource allocation, we model the CEF based on the evolutionary game theory. …”
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