Network-sensitive financial regulation by Enriques, L, Romano, A, Wetzer, T

“…<br><br> This Article shows that policies building upon insights from network theory (network-sensitive policies) can address systemic risk more effectively than traditional atomistic policies, also in areas where an atomistic approach would seem natural, such as the corporate governance of systemically important financial institutions. In particular, we consider four prescriptions for the governance of systemically important institutions (one on directors' liability, two on executive compensation and one on failing financial institutions' shareholders appraisal rights in mergers) and show how making them network-sensitive would both increase their effectiveness in taming systemic risk and better calibrate their impact on individual institutions.…”

Extended shareholder liability for systematically important financial institutions by Romano, A, Enriques, L, Macey, JR

“…Regulators generally have tried to address the problems posed by the excessive risk-taking of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) by placing restrictions on the activities in which SIFIs engage. …”