Nash equilibrium and bisimulation invariance by Gutierrez, J, Harrenstein, P, Perelli, G, Wooldridge, M

Expressiveness and Nash equilibrium in iterated Boolean games by Gutierrez, J, Harrenstein, P, Perelli, G, Wooldridge, M

Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture by Feldmann, R, Mavronicolas, M, Pieris, A

Equilibria in sequential allocation by Aziz, H, Goldberg, P, Walsh, T

“…We then present a linear-time algorithm that returns a profile (which we call the “bluff profile”) that is in pure Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, the outcome of the bluff profile is the same as that of the truthful pro- file and the profile is in pure Nash equilibrium for all cardinal utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences. …”

A tool for the automated verification of Nash equilibria in concurrent games by Toumi, A, Gutierrez, J, Wooldridge, M

“…The basic analytical concept for Reactive Modules Games is Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we describe a tool through which we can automatically verify Nash equilibrium strategies for Reactive Modules Games. …”

Probabilistic sensitivity of Nash equilibria in multi-agent games: a wait-and-judge approach by Fele, F, Margellos, K

“…The latter constitutes, to the best of our knowledge, the first application of the so-called scenario approach to multi-agent Nash equilibrium problems. The efficacy of our approach is demonstrated in simulation for the charging coordination of an electric vehicle fleet.…”

On the connection between Nash equilibria and social optima in electric vehicle charging control games by Deori, L, Margellos, K, Prandini, M

“…We approach the problem as a multi-agent game in the presence of constraints and formulate an auxiliary minimization program whose solution is shown to be the unique Nash equilibrium of the PEV charging control game, for any finite number of possibly heterogeneous agents. …”

Distributed equilibrium seeking in aggregative games: linear convergence under singular perturbations lens by Carnevale, G, Fabiani, F, Fele, F, Margellos, K, Notarstefano, G

“…We present a fully-distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. …”

Iterated Boolean games for rational verification by Gutierrez, J, Gao, T, Wooldridge, M

“…More specifically, rational verification asks whether a given property, expressed as a temporal logic formula, is satisfied in a computation of the system that might be generated if agents within the system choose strategies for selecting actions that form a Nash equilibrium. We show that, when agents are modelled using the Simple Reactive Modules Language, a widely-used system modelling language for concurrent and multi-agent systems, this problem can be reduced to a simpler query: whether some iterated game—in which players have control over a finite set of Boolean variables and goals expressed as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae—has a Nash equilibrium. …”

Game−Theoretic Golog under Partial Observability by Finzi, A, Lukasiewicz, T

“…The approach allows for partially specifying a high-level control program for a system of multiple agents, and for optimally filling in missing details by viewing it as a generalization of a special POSG and computing a Nash equilibrium.</p>…”

Nash equilibria in concurrent games with lexicographic preferences by Gutierrez, J, Murano, A, Perelli, G, Rubin, S, Wooldridge, M

“…In particular, we show that deciding the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium in such games is decidable, even if players’ deviations are implemented as infinite memory strategies.…”

Reasoning about equilibria in game-like concurrent systems by Gutierrez, J, Harrenstein, P, Wooldridge, M

“…The key operator in this logic is a path quantifier [NE]ϕ, which asserts that ϕ holds on all Nash equilibrium computations of the system…”

Game−Theoretic Agent Programming in Golog under Partial Observability by Finzi, A, Lukasiewicz, T

“…The approach allows for partially specifying a high-level control program for a system of multiple agents, and for optimally filling in missing details by viewing it as a generalization of a special POSG and computing a Nash equilibrium. We illustrate this approach along a robotic rugby example.…”

On the robustness of equilibria in generalized aggregative games by Fabiani, F, Margellos, K, Goulart, P

“…We assess the robustness of equilibria in generalized Nash equilibrium problems in aggregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by uncertainty with a possibly unknown probability distribution. …”

Unifying learning in games and graphical models by Rezek, I, Roberts, S, Rogers, A, Dash, R, Jennings, N, IEEE

“…In particular, we view fictitious play as a method of optimising the Kullback-Leibler distance between current mixed strategies and optimal mixed strategies at Nash equilibrium. In reverse, probabilistic inference in the variational mean-field framework can be viewed as fictitious game play to learn the best strategies which explain a probabilistic graphical model. © 2005 IEEE.…”

A Hotelling-Downs framework for party nominees by Harrenstein, P, Lisowski, G, Sridharan, R, Turrini, P

“…We show that finding a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete for the general case. However, if there are only two competing parties, this can be achieved in linear time. …”

The Fisher Market Game: Equilibrium and Welfare. by Brânzei, S, Chen, Y, Deng, X, Filos-Ratsikas, A, Frederiksen, S, Zhang, J

“…We show that the Fisher market game always has a pure Nash equilibrium, for buyers with linear, Leontief, and Cobb-Douglas utility functions, which are three representative classes of utility functions in the important Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) family. …”

A game theoretic approach for safe and distributed control of unmanned aerial vehicles by do Nascimento, AA, Papachristodoulou, A, Margellos, K

“…The method combines Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) and a primal-dual algorithm for Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in generalized games. Feedback is introduced by Model Predictive Control (MPC) and we analyze its stability properties. …”

Complexity of finding equilibria of plurality voting under structured preferences by Elkind, E, Markakis, E, Obraztsova, S, Skowron, P

“…Elkind et al. [15] have shown that for most of these combinations of tie-breaking rules and voters' attitudes finding a Nash equilibrium is NP-hard; in contrast, we demonstrate that in almost all cases this problem is tractable for preferences that are single-peaked or single-crossing, under mild technical assumptions.…”

Learning quadratic games on networks by Leng, Y, Dong, X, Wu, J, Pentland, A

“…Our frameworks are based on the Nash equilibrium of such games and involve solving a joint optimization problem for the graph structure and the individual marginal benefits. …”