Game perception and harmony in 3 x 3 games: an experiment in cognitive game theory by Zizzo, D

“…The experiment presented in this paper employs 3x3 games to analyze how perception of a game affects behavior in the presence or absence of a minimal framing effect and of uncertainty about the values of some game payoffs. …”

Game perception and harmony in 3 x 3 games by Zizzo, D

“…The experiment presented in this paper employs 3 x 3 games to analyze how perception of a game affects behavior in the presence or absence of a minimal framing effect and of uncertainty about the values of some game payoffs. …”

Game Perception and Harmony in 3 x 3 Games. by Zizzo, D

Game harmony as a predictor of cooperation in 2 x 2 games by Zizzo, D, Tan, J

“…This paper presents an experimental test of the relationship between game harmony and cooperation in 2 x 2 games. Game harmony measures describe how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs: coordination games and constant-sum games are examples of games of perfect harmony and disharmony, respectively, with most games being somewhere in the middle. …”

Game Harmony as a Predictor of Cooperation in 2 x 2 Games. by Zizzo, D, Tan, J

Multilateral Subsidy Games. by Leahy, D, Neary, J

“…When spillovers are high, national governments under-subsidize from a global welfare perspective, but the subsidy game is welfare superior to non-intervention.…”

The hedge fund game by Foster, D, Young, H

“…Under any incentive scheme that does not levy penalties for underperformance, managers with no investment skill can game the system so as to earn (in expectation) the same amount per dollar of funds under management as the most skilled managers. …”

The Hedge Fund Game. by Young, H, Foster, D

“…Under any incentive scheme that does not levy penalties for underperformance, managers with no investment skill can game the system so as to earn (in expectation) the same amount per dollar of funds under management as the most skilled managers. …”

Multilateral subsidy games by Neary, P, Leahy, D

“…When spillovers are high, national governments under-subsidize from a global welfare perspective, but the subsidy game is welfare superior to non-intervention.…”

Undiscounted bandit games by Keller, G, Rady, S

“…We analyze undiscounted continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. …”

Harmony of Games in Normal Form. by Zizzo, D

Harmony of games in normal form by Zizzo, D

“…Game harmony is a generic game property that can be used to predict cooperation in both generic and well-known normal form games. …”

Fast Convergence in Population Games by Arieli, I, Young, H

“…We propose a novel family of learning dynamics that exhibits fast convergence for a large class of population games that includes coordination games, potential games, and supermodular games as special cases. …”

Dependence and uniqueness in Bayesian games by Beggs, A

“…In contrast to the global games literature, noise is not assumed to be additive. …”

Learning in monotone Bayesian games by Beggs, A

“…Convergence to equilibrium is shown in the case of supermodular games and potential games.…”

Layoffs and quits in repeated games by Casas-Arce, P

“…We consider two-player games where player 1 can decide to let the opponent continue in the game or replace it with a new player. …”

The value of a coordination game by Kets, W, Kager, W, Sandroni, A

“…The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. …”

Layoffs and Quits in Repeated Games. by Casas-Arce, P

“…We consider two-player games where player 1 can decide to let the opponent continue in the game or replace it with a new player. …”

Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games. by Beggs, A

“…In contrast to the global games literature, noise is not assumed to be additive. …”

Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision by Ederer, F, Holden, R, Meyer, M

“… <p style="text-align:justify;"> It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. …”