Work/Family Arrangements across the OECD: Incorporatingthe Female-Breadwinner Model by Kowalewska, H, Vitali, A

“…Pure female-breadwinner families are as poor as pure male-breadwinner households, if not poorer. …”

Harmony of games in normal form by Zizzo, D

“…It describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs. Pure coordination games are games of complete harmony, and constant-sum games of pure disharmony: the majority of games is somewhere in the middle. …”

On the measurement of harmony in normal form games by Zizzo, D

“…Game harmony is a generic game property that describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs. Pure coordination games are games of complete harmony,and constant-sum games are games of pure disharmony: the majority of games is somewhere in the middle. …”

Bluffing as a mixed strategy by Norman, T

“…Moreover, Newman's solution for this case - which also has pure-strategy bluffing - is shown not to be a sequential equilibrium. …”

Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems by Young, H, Pradelski, B

“…We propose a variant of log linear learning that is completely uncoupled and that selects an efficient pure Nash equilibrium in all generic n-person games that possess at least one pure Nash equilibrium. …”

Efficiency and Equilibrium in Trial and Error Learning. by Young, H, Pradelski, B

“…We show that by modifying a trial and error learning rule proposed by Young (2009) we obtain a completely uncoupled learning process that selects a Pareto optimal equilibrium whenever a pure equilibrium exists. When a pure equilibrium does not exist, there is a simple formula that relates the long-run likelihood of each disequilibrium state to the total payoff over all agents and the maximum payoff gain that would result from a unilateral deviation by some agent. …”

Learning by trial and error. by Young, H

“…Unlike a learning procedure proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (2006), it requires no knowledge of the other players' actions: learning proceeds purely by responding to one's own payoff history. …”

Learning by trial and error by Young, H

“…Unlike a learning procedure proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (2006), it requires no knowledge of the other players' actions: learning proceeds purely by responding to one's own payoff history. …”

On the convergence of reinforcement learning by Beggs, A

“…Strategies converge in constant-sum games with unique equilibria if they are pure or in 2…”

Rapid Evolution under Inertia. by Norman, T

“…This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m x m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing "inertia" states that allow Ellison's (Review of Economic Studies 67, 2000, 17{45) "step-by- step" evolution to occur.…”

Rapid Evolution under Inertia. by Norman, T

“…This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m x m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing "inertia" states that allow Ellison's (Review of Economic Studies 67, 2000, 17{45) "step-by- step" evolution to occur.…”

Rapid evolution under inertia by Norman, T

“…This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m x m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing inertia states that allow Ellison's (Review of Economic Studies 67, 2000, 17-45) step-by-step evolution to occur.…”

Social Coordination and Social Change. by Young, H

“…Choosing the rules is at bottom a pure coordination problem, since people must agree on the rules in order to play. …”

On the Convergence of Reinforcement Learning. by Beggs, A

“…Strategies converge in constant-sum games with unique equilibria if they are pure or if they are mixed and the game is 2 x 2. …”

A theory of stable price dispersion by Myatt, DP, Ronayne, D

“…In contrast to the mixed-strategy equilibria of single-stage games, a unique profile of distinct prices is supported by the play of pure strategies along the equilibrium path, and so we predict stable price dispersion. …”

A personal perspective on Raghu Varadhan's role in the development of Stochastic Analysis. by Lyons, T

“…It has importance for its intrinsic interest and for its contributions to other foundational \pure" areas of mathematics, as well as for its contributions to the applications of mathematics. …”

Risk-Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines. by Fafchamps, M, Lund, S

“…The evidence is consistent with models of quasi-credit where risk is shared within tightly knit networks through flexible, zero interest informal loans combined with pure transfers.…”

Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines by Fafchamps, M, Lund, S

“…The evidence is consistent with models of quasi-credit where risk is shared within tightly knit networks through flexible, zero interest informal loans combined with pure transfers.…”

Sex workers, stigma and self-image: evidence from Kolkata brothels by Ghosal, S, Jana, S, Mani, A, Mitra, S, Roy, S

“…Our findings highlight the potential of purely psychological interventions to improve the life choices and outcomes of marginalized groups.…”

Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting. by Roberts, K

“…The set of possibilities is rich, as is demonstrated by an exhaustive study of a three person, three state world. Equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist but a weakening of the equilibrium concept to admit probabilistic voting allows a general existence result to be proved. …”