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201
Strong Activity Rules for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
Published 2009Get full text
Working Paper -
202
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203
Auctions to gas transmission access : the British experience
Published 2009“…Moreover, auctions are more transparent and better facilitate entry.…”
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Working Paper -
204
Auction design and the market for sulfur dioxide emissions
Published 2009“…These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Our empirical analysis of the SO2 emissions market shows that the auctions have become a small part of a relatively efficient market and that the auction design problems that have attracted the most attention have had no effect on actual market prices.…”
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Working Paper -
205
Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
Published 2011“…These rules find application in the design of iterative combinatorial auctions for real world scenarios, for example in spectrum auctions, in airline landing slot auctions, and in procurement auctions. …”
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Article -
206
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207
Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions
Published 2004Subjects: Get full text
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208
Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling
Published 2014“…We study dynamic models of online-advertising auctions in the Internet: advertisers compete for space on a web page over multiple time periods, and the web page displays ads in differentiated slots based on their bids and other considerations. …”
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209
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210
xBid - blockchain-based auction platform
Published 2023“…This final year project aims to develop xBid, a proof-of-concept blockchain-based auction system with a focus on peer-to-peer usage. …”
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Final Year Project (FYP) -
211
Economics of semantic communication system: an auction approach
Published 2023“…For semantic information trading, our designed auction approach can support the trading between multiple semantic information sellers and buyers, while ensuring individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and budget balance, and moreover, allowing them to achieve higher utilities than the baseline method.…”
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Journal Article -
212
Electronic marketplace : a study on online auctions.
Published 2008Subjects: “…DRNTU::Business::Information technology::Auction…”
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Final Year Project (FYP) -
213
Substitute valuations, auctions, and equilibrium with discrete goods
Published 2007“…The weaker notion guarantees monotonicity of tatonnement processses and convergence of clock auctions to a pseudo-equilibrium, but only the stronger notion, which treats each unit traded as a distinct good with its own price, guarantees that every pseudo-equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium, the Vickrey outcome is in the core, and the law of aggregate demand is satisfied. …”
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214
Auction Design with a Risk Averse Seller.
Published 1999“…We consider auctions with a risk averse seller in independent private values environments with risk neutral buyers. …”
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215
An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion
Published 2005“…We consider an auction setting where the buyers are risk averse with correlated private valuations (CARA preferences, binary types), and characterize the optimal mechanism for a risk neutral seller. …”
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216
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217
Substitute Valuations, Auctions, and Equilibrium with Discrete Goods.
Published 2007“…The weaker notion guarantees monotonicity of tˆatonnement processes and convergence of clock auctions to a pseudo-equilibrium, but only the stronger notion, which treats each unit traded as a distinct good with its own price, guarantees that every pseudo-equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium, the Vickrey outcome is in the core, and the “law of aggregate demand” is satisfied. …”
Working paper -
218
On the complexity of equilibrium computation in first-price auctions
Published 2023“…We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes–Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. …”
Journal article -
219
Solving strong-substitutes product-mix auctions
Published 2023“…<p>This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions: it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction’s bidding language to truthfully express their strong-substitutes preferences over an arbitrary number of goods, each of which is available in multiple discrete units. …”
Journal article -
220
Revenue Guarantees in the Generalized Second Price Auction
Published 2014“…Sponsored search auctions are the main source of revenue for search engines. …”
Journal article