Strong Activity Rules for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions by Harsha, Pavithra, Barnhart, Cynthia, Parkes, David C., Zhang, Haoqi

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Consensus-based auctions for decentralized task assignment by Brunet, Luc (Luc P. V.)

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Auctions to gas transmission access : the British experience by McDaniel, Tanga, Neuhoff, Karsten

“…Moreover, auctions are more transparent and better facilitate entry.…”
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Auction design and the market for sulfur dioxide emissions by Joskow, Paul L., Schmalensee, Richard, Bailey, Elizabeth M.

“…These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Our empirical analysis of the SO2 emissions market shows that the auctions have become a small part of a relatively efficient market and that the auction design problems that have attracted the most attention have had no effect on actual market prices.…”
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Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions by Harsha, Pavithra, Barnhart, Cynthia, Parkes, David C., Zhang, Haoqi

“…These rules find application in the design of iterative combinatorial auctions for real world scenarios, for example in spectrum auctions, in airline landing slot auctions, and in procurement auctions. …”
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Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions by Ashenfelter, Orley, Genesove, David

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Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions by Gupta, Shobhit, Gallien, Jérémie

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Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling by Menache, Ishai, Ozdaglar, Asuman E., Srikant, R., Acemoglu, Daron

“…We study dynamic models of online-advertising auctions in the Internet: advertisers compete for space on a web page over multiple time periods, and the web page displays ads in differentiated slots based on their bids and other considerations. …”
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Online auctions in procurement : the cost/goodwill tradeoff by Rameson, Tyler J. (Tyler James), 1974-

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xBid - blockchain-based auction platform by Lee, Peter Jia De

“…This final year project aims to develop xBid, a proof-of-concept blockchain-based auction system with a focus on peer-to-peer usage. …”
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Economics of semantic communication system: an auction approach by Liew, Zi Qin, Du, Hongyang, Lim, Bryan Wei Yang, Xiong, Zehui, Niyato, Dusit, Miao, Chunyan, Kim, Dong In

“…For semantic information trading, our designed auction approach can support the trading between multiple semantic information sellers and buyers, while ensuring individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and budget balance, and moreover, allowing them to achieve higher utilities than the baseline method.…”
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Electronic marketplace : a study on online auctions. by Koh, Adrian Poh Soon., Yok, Joon Meng.

Subjects: “…DRNTU::Business::Information technology::Auction…”
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Substitute valuations, auctions, and equilibrium with discrete goods by Strulovici, B, Milgrom, P

“…The weaker notion guarantees monotonicity of tatonnement processses and convergence of clock auctions to a pseudo-equilibrium, but only the stronger notion, which treats each unit traded as a distinct good with its own price, guarantees that every pseudo-equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium, the Vickrey outcome is in the core, and the law of aggregate demand is satisfied. …”

Auction Design with a Risk Averse Seller. by Eső, P, Futó, G

“…We consider auctions with a risk averse seller in independent private values environments with risk neutral buyers. …”

An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion by Eső, P

“…We consider an auction setting where the buyers are risk averse with correlated private valuations (CARA preferences, binary types), and characterize the optimal mechanism for a risk neutral seller. …”

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions by Colini-Baldeschi, R, Goldberg, P, De Keijzer, B, Leonardi, S, Roughgarden, T, Turchetta, S

Substitute Valuations, Auctions, and Equilibrium with Discrete Goods. by Milgrom, P, Stulovici, B

“…The weaker notion guarantees monotonicity of tˆatonnement processes and convergence of clock auctions to a pseudo-equilibrium, but only the stronger notion, which treats each unit traded as a distinct good with its own price, guarantees that every pseudo-equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium, the Vickrey outcome is in the core, and the “law of aggregate demand” is satisfied. …”

On the complexity of equilibrium computation in first-price auctions by Filos-Ratsikas, A, Giannakopoulos, Y, Hollender, A, Lazos, P, Poças, D

“…We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes–Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. …”

Solving strong-substitutes product-mix auctions by Baldwin, E, Goldberg, P, Klemperer, P, Lock, E

“…<p>This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions: it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction’s bidding language to truthfully express their strong-substitutes preferences over an arbitrary number of goods, each of which is available in multiple discrete units. …”

Revenue Guarantees in the Generalized Second Price Auction by Caragiannis, I, Kaklamanis, C, Kanellopoulos, P, Kyropoulou, M

“…Sponsored search auctions are the main source of revenue for search engines. …”