Bilateral trading in divisible double auctions by Du, Songzi, Zhu, Haoxiang

“…Existing models of divisible double auctions typically require three or more traders—when there are two traders, the usual linear equilibria imply market breakdowns unless the traders’ values are negatively correlated. …”
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Assessing the performance of real estate auctions by Mayer, Christopher J

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Auction Design for ROI-Constrained Buyers by Golrezaei, Negin, Lobel, Ilan, Paes Leme, Renato

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Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions by Daskalakis, Costis, Fishelson, Maxwell, Lucier, Brendan, Velusamy, Santhoshini, Syrgkanis, Vasilis

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Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions by McAdams, David

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Forward-looking bidders in sequential auctions by Zeithammer, Robert, 1975-

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Polynomial auction algorithms for shortest paths

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Modified auction algorithms for shortest paths

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Parallel shortest path auction algorithms

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An auction algorithm for the max-flow problem

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Collusion-Resilient Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions by Valiant, Paul, Micali, Silvio

“…In auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, the same propertiesin combinatorial auctions.…”
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Resilient Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions by Micali, Silvio, Valiant, Paul

“…The problem of collusion is particularly evident for UNRESTRICTED combinatorial auctions}, arguably the hardest type of auctions.We thus investigate how much revenue can be guaranteed, in unrestricted combinatorial auctions, by dominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms that are COLLUSION-RESILIENT in a very strong sense; and obtain almost matching upper- and lower-bounds.…”
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Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions by Chen, Jing, Micali, Silvio, Valiant, Paul

“…Because of its devastating effects in auctions and other mechanisms, collusion is prohibited and legally prosecuted. …”
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Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers by Maskin, Eric, Riley, John

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Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness by Ashlagi, Itai, Braverman, Mark, Hassidim, Avinatan, Lavi, Ron, Tennenholtz, Moshe

“…We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constraints. …”
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Epistemic Implementation and The Arbitrary-Belief Auction by Chen, Jing, Micali, Silvio, Pass, Rafael

“…We exemplify the power of our framework in single-good auctions by introducing and achieving a new class of revenue benchmarks, defined over the players' arbitrary beliefs, that can be much higher than classical ones, and are unattainable by traditional mechanisms. …”
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Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions by Gorbenko, Alexander S., Malenko, Andrey

“…We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. …”
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An investigation of price dispersion in Internet auctions by Perutz, Mark A. (Mark Andrew)

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Existence of competitive equilibria in combinatorial auctions by Lee, Ji Young, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions by Gorbenko, Alexander S., Malenko, Andrey

“…Using data on auctions of companies, we estimate valuations (maximum willingness to pay) of strategic and financial bidders from their bids. …”
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