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Bilateral trading in divisible double auctions
Published 2019“…Existing models of divisible double auctions typically require three or more traders—when there are two traders, the usual linear equilibria imply market breakdowns unless the traders’ values are negatively correlated. …”
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Collusion-Resilient Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions
Published 2007“…In auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, the same propertiesin combinatorial auctions.…”
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Resilient Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions
Published 2008“…The problem of collusion is particularly evident for UNRESTRICTED combinatorial auctions}, arguably the hardest type of auctions.We thus investigate how much revenue can be guaranteed, in unrestricted combinatorial auctions, by dominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms that are COLLUSION-RESILIENT in a very strong sense; and obtain almost matching upper- and lower-bounds.…”
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Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions
Published 2011“…Because of its devastating effects in auctions and other mechanisms, collusion is prohibited and legally prosecuted. …”
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Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
Published 2011“…We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constraints. …”
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Epistemic Implementation and The Arbitrary-Belief Auction
Published 2012“…We exemplify the power of our framework in single-good auctions by introducing and achieving a new class of revenue benchmarks, defined over the players' arbitrary beliefs, that can be much higher than classical ones, and are unattainable by traditional mechanisms. …”
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Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions
Published 2012“…We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. …”
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Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions
Published 2015“…Using data on auctions of companies, we estimate valuations (maximum willingness to pay) of strategic and financial bidders from their bids. …”
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