Infinite sequential Nash equilibrium by Stephane Le Roux

“…In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. …”
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Nash Equilibrium and Bisimulation Invariance by Julian Gutierrez, Paul Harrenstein, Giuseppe Perelli, Michael Wooldridge

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Implementation and strong Nash equilibrium by Maskin, Eric

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Nash equilibrium and bisimulation invariance by Gutierrez, J, Harrenstein, P, Perelli, G, Wooldridge, M

Nash equilibrium and bisimulation invariance by Gutierrez, J, Harrenstein, B, Perelli, G, Wooldridge, M

Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium by Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K.

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On the complexity of approximating a nash equilibrium by Daskalakis, Constantinos

“…We show that computing a relative---that is, multiplicative as opposed to additive---approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games is PPAD-complete, even for constant values of the approximation. …”
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Nash equilibrium seeking with prescribed performance by Sun, Chao, Hu, Guoqiang

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Learning, Hypothesis Testing, and Nash Equilibrium. by Foster, D, Young, H

Learning Hypothesis Testing and Nash Equilibrium. by Young, P

“…Although there exist learning processes for which the empirical distribution of play comes close to Nash equilibrium it is an open question whether the players themselves can learn to play equilibrium strategies without assuming that they have prior knowledge of their opponents' strategies and/or payoffs We exhibit a large class of statistical hypotheses testing procedures that solve this problem Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often At each time the players have hypotheses about their opponents' repeated game strategies They frequently test their hypotheses against the opponents' recent actions When a hypotheses fails test a new one is adopted Play is almost rational in the sense that at each point of time the players' strategies are epsilon -best replies to their beliefs We show that at least 1 - epsilon of the time t these hypotheses testing strategies constitute an epsilon-equilibrium of the repeated game from t on; in fact the strategies are close to being subgame perfect for long stretches of time Further all players for whom prediction matters ie whose best responses depend on the opponents' behavior learn to predict within epsilon…”

The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium : a survey by Maskin, Eric

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Expressiveness and Nash equilibrium in iterated Boolean games by Gutierrez, J, Harrenstein, P, Perelli, G, Wooldridge, M

“…The (possibly empty) set of Nash equilibria of an iterated Boolean game can be understood as inducing a set of computations, each computation representing one way the system could evolve if players chose strategies that together constitute a Nash equilibrium. Such a set of equilibrium computations expresses a temporal property—which may or may not be expressible within a particular fragment. …”

Probably approximately correct Nash equilibrium learning by Fele, F, Margellos, K

“…Following a data driven paradigm, we represent uncertainty by means of scenarios and seek a robust Nash equilibrium solution. We treat the Nash equilibrium computation problem within the realm of probably approximately correct (PAC) learning. …”

Expressiveness and Nash equilibrium in iterated Boolean games by Gutierrez, J, Harrenstein, P, Perelli, G, Wooldridge, M

Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture by Feldmann, R, Mavronicolas, M, Pieris, A

Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture by Feldmann, R, Mavronicolas, M, Pieris, A

Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium for building stable systems by Doufene, Abdelkrim, Krob, Daniel

“…While Pareto optimality is used to select best architectures and to support independent decisions, Nash equilibrium is used to find out architectural equilibrium and to support interdependent decisions. …”
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Operant Matching as a Nash Equilibrium of an Intertemporal Game by Loewenstein, Yonatan, Prelec, Drazen, Seung, H. Sebastian

“…If each self is blind to the state of the world and discounts future rewards completely, then the resulting game has at least one Nash equilibrium that satisfies both Herrnstein's matching law and the unpredictability of individual choices. …”
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Nash equilibrium seeking for N-coalition noncooperative games by Ye, Maojiao, Hu, Guoqiang, Lewis, Frank L.

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Gradient-free distributed optimization and nash equilibrium seeking by Pang, Yipeng

“…This dissertation focuses on the research of gradient-free distributed algorithms in optimization problems where the agents collaboratively achieve a system-level objective, and Nash equilibrium seeking problems where the agents/players selfishly minimize their own cost functions. …”
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