When Is a Belief True Because of Luck? by Greene, Preston

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Deep Metaphysical Indeterminacy by Skow, Bradford

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The Tenseless Theory of Time and the Moodless Theory of Modality by Skow, Bradford

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What are centered worlds? by Liao, Shen-yi.

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Xin : being trustworthy by Sung, Winnie

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Kripke's two definitions of rigid designation by Li, Chenyang

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Experience and Content by Byrne, Alex

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Experience and content by Byrne, Alex

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A dilemma for non-analytic naturalism by Forcehimes, Andrew T.

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The simulation argument: Reply to Weatherson by Bostrom, N

“…. © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2005.…”

On Hatzimoysis on sentimental value by Fletcher, G

“…One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis (The Philosophical Quarterly 53: 373-379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard's ideas on two distinctions in value. …”

A-theory for b-theorists by Parsons, J

“…. © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2002.…”

The instability of vague terms by Mahtani, A

“…. © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004.…”

Are we living in a computer simulation? by Bostrom, N

“…. © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2003.…”

Margins for error: a reply by Williamson, T

“…I address Peter Mott's 'Margins for Error and the Sorites Paradox' (The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 494–503). Mott criticizes my account of inexact knowledge, on which it satisfies margin for error principles of the form 'If one knows in a given case, one avoids false belief in sufficiently similar cases'. …”

The Doomsday Argument and the self-indication assumption: Reply to Odum by Bostrom, N, Cirkovic, M

“…. © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2003.…”

Am I Too Pixelated? by Alethea Black

“…In 2003, Nick Bostrom published his highly influential “Simulation Argument” in  Philosophical Quarterly(Bostrom, 2003), an idea taken so seriously that even Bank of America has sent out alerts to its clients. …”
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Self-knowledge, belief, ability (and agency?) by Campbell, L

“…“How knowledge Works.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 433–451; John Hyman (2015). …”

David Ross, Ideal Utilitarianism, and the Intrinsic Value of Acts by Francesco Orsi

“…Consequentializing Moral Theories. Pacific PhilosophicalQuarterly, 88(39-73), 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00280.x H. …”
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