Collusion-Resilient Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions by Valiant, Paul, Micali, Silvio

“…In auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, the same propertiesin combinatorial auctions.…”
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Resilient Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions by Micali, Silvio, Valiant, Paul

“…The problem of collusion is particularly evident for UNRESTRICTED combinatorial auctions}, arguably the hardest type of auctions.We thus investigate how much revenue can be guaranteed, in unrestricted combinatorial auctions, by dominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms that are COLLUSION-RESILIENT in a very strong sense; and obtain almost matching upper- and lower-bounds.…”
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Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions by Chen, Jing, Micali, Silvio, Valiant, Paul

“…Because of its devastating effects in auctions and other mechanisms, collusion is prohibited and legally prosecuted. …”
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Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers by Maskin, Eric, Riley, John

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Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness by Ashlagi, Itai, Braverman, Mark, Hassidim, Avinatan, Lavi, Ron, Tennenholtz, Moshe

“…We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constraints. …”
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Epistemic Implementation and The Arbitrary-Belief Auction by Chen, Jing, Micali, Silvio, Pass, Rafael

“…We exemplify the power of our framework in single-good auctions by introducing and achieving a new class of revenue benchmarks, defined over the players' arbitrary beliefs, that can be much higher than classical ones, and are unattainable by traditional mechanisms. …”
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Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions by Gorbenko, Alexander S., Malenko, Andrey

“…We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. …”
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An investigation of price dispersion in Internet auctions by Perutz, Mark A. (Mark Andrew)

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Existence of competitive equilibria in combinatorial auctions by Lee, Ji Young, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions by Gorbenko, Alexander S., Malenko, Andrey

“…Using data on auctions of companies, we estimate valuations (maximum willingness to pay) of strategic and financial bidders from their bids. …”
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Consumer behaviour in adoption of mobile auction. by Yeo, Yaowen., Kugenthiran A. Raveenthiran., Ho, Cheuk Ying.

“…In this study, we explore consumers' behaviour in terms of value, interactivity and self-efficacy in the adoption of mobile auctions (m-auctions). The analysis of the structural model is conducted using LISREL 8.80 and indices show that the model has relatively good fit with reliable instruments. …”
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Incentive compatible design of reverse auctions. by Gravin, Nikolai.

“…We consider two classes of optimization problems that emerge in the set up of the reverse auctions (a.k.a. procurement auctions). Unlike the standard optimization taking place for a commonly known input, we assume that every individual submits his piece of the input and may misreport his data or not follow the protocol, in order to gain a better outcome. …”
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Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature. by Klemperer, P

“…This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. …”

What Really Matters in Auction Design. by Klemperer, P

Primary auction of slots at European airports by Pertuiset, T, Santos, G

“…We use the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction mechanism to propose a system of primary auctions of slots at congested European airports. …”

Bribing and Signaling in the Second-Price Auction. by Eső, P, Schummer, J

“…We examine whether a two-bidder, second-price auction for a single good (with private, independent values) is immune to a simple form of collusion, where one bidder may bribe the other to commit to stay away from the auction (i.e. submit a bid of zero). …”

On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions by Koutsoupias, E, Pierrakos, G

Revenue Guarantees in Sponsored Search Auctions by Caragiannis, I, Kaklamanis, C, Kanellopoulos, P, Kyropoulou, M

Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions by Giannakopoulos, Y, Koutsoupias, E

“…We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions. The framework extends linear programming duality and complementarity to constraints with partial derivatives. …”

On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions by Koutsoupias, E, Pierrakos, G